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This paper provides an empirical analysis of the financial structure of large buyouts.  We collect detailed
information on the financing of 1157 worldwide private equity deals from 1980 to 2008.  Buyout leverage
is cross-sectionally unrelated to the leverage of matched public firms, and is largely driven by factors
other than what explains leverage in public firms.  In particular, the economy-wide cost of borrowing
is the main driver of both the quantity and the composition of debt in these buyouts.  Credit conditions
also have a strong effect on prices paid in buyouts, even after controlling for prices of equivalent public
market companies. Finally, the use of high leverage in transactions negatively affects fund performance,
controlling for fund vintage and other relevant characteristics. The results are consistent with the view
that the availability of financing impacts booms and busts in the private equity market, and that agency
problems between private equity funds and their investors can affect buyout capital structures.
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I.  Introduction 
 
Understanding the financial structure of private equity firms is important not only in and of itself, but 
also  for  understanding  the  role  that  capital  structure  plays  for  corporations  in  general.    In  1989, 
Michael Jensen famously predicted that the leveraged buyout would eclipse the public corporation and 
become the dominant corporate form (see Jensen (1989)).  His argument was based on the thesis that 
the governance and financing of leveraged buyouts was superior in dealing with agency problems and 
restructuring.    Together  with  active  boards,  high-powered  management  compensation,  and 
concentrated ownership, he considered leverage to be an essential part of this superior governance 
model.  Unlike public firms, Jensen argued, private equity funds optimized the capital structure in 
companies they acquired, to take full advantage of the tax and incentive benefits of leverage (trading 
these benefits off against the costs of financial distress).
1 
As luck would have it, shortly after Michael Jensen’s prediction, buyouts virtually disappeared 
in the wake of the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989.  The dependence of buyout activity on 
credit market conditions has been evident ever since.  Although buyout activity was very low in the 
early 1990’s, it recovered in the later part of the 1990’s and reached record volume during the credit 
boom in 2006-2007, only to come to an abrupt end with the credit crisis in late 2007.  This boom and 
bust pattern underscores the importance of leverage to the private equity model.  It is also consistent 
with a somewhat different view of buyouts from Jensen’s:  Instead of tailoring the capital structure 
optimally to the needs of the company, LBOs could simply be relying on cheap debt to take levered 
bets on firms.  Indeed, critics of LBOs have argued that the high leverage used in buyouts could 
jeopardize the health of otherwise sound firms.
2 
In  this  paper,  we  empirically  investigate  the  determinants  of  capital  structure  in  LBOs, 
highlighting the crucial importance of debt markets in providing capital for the financing of buyouts. 
Our paper has two main goals:  First, we want to understand how private equity funds determine the 
capital structures in the leveraged buyout transactions they undertake. In particular, can buyout capital 
structure  be  understood  by  the  same  models  that  explain  capital  structure  of  public  corporations?  
                                                 
1 This is the so-called “trade-off theory”.  See Myers (2001). 
2 For example, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, one of the proponents of the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive for the 
regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds in the European Union, said that “in order to produce ever higher 
returns, private equity firms have increased the risk of bankruptcy, which always generate public costs” (speech at the 
Commision conference on hedge funds and private equity, Brussels February 26




Second,  what  are  the  consequences  of  buyouts  adopting  alternative  capital  structures?    Does  the 
financing of a buyout affect its pricing and eventual return?   
To study the factors affecting buyout capital structure, we construct a new dataset containing 
detailed  information  about  the  financing  of  a  large  international  sample  of  buyouts.  This  sample 
contains 1157 buyouts, 694 of which were of North American firms and the remaining 463 of which 
were of firms from 24 different countries outside North America, mainly in Western Europe. For each 
buyout in our sample, we obtain detailed information about the financial structure of the transactions, 
including details on the securities issued in various tranches of senior and subordinated debt, payback 
schedules, and information on pricing.  Unlike most previous work, our sample includes not only 
buyouts  of  public  companies,  so  called  “public-to-private”  transactions,  but  also  the  much  more 
frequently  observed  buyouts  of  private  companies,  such  as  family  firms,  corporate  divisions,  and 
companies already owned by other private equity firms.
3 Moreover, unlike most other studies, which 
have focussed on the buyout wave in the 1980's, our sample considers international buyout transactions 
from  1980  through  2008.
4  This  sample  allows  a  much  longer  temporal  analysis,  including  the 
extraordinary credit market conditions prevailing in 2006/7.  In terms of representativeness, our data 
includes deals from a total of 176 distinct private equity sponsors and incorporates practically all the 
major investors active in this market during our period of study.  We do have a bias towards larger 
buyouts because of our reliance on the syndicated loan market for capital structure information.   
We  first  provide  a  detailed  description  of  the  financial  structure  used  in  this  sample  of 
leveraged buyouts.  Not surprisingly, our sample firms were highly leveraged as a result of the buyout 
transactions.  Throughout most of the sample, the syndicated bank loan market provided the majority 
of the debt to fund the transactions, and this debt is typically divided into a number of tranches.  In 
addition  to  the  bank  debt,  there  are  often  multiple  layers  of  subordinated  debt,  in  the  form  of 
mezzanine  debt,  2
nd  lien  debt  etc.,  as  well  as  different  classes  of  corporate  bonds.    The  different 
tranches and layers differ in seniority, maturity, repayment terms, and pricing.  The level and the 
structure of debt vary significantly over time.  Leverage in the LBO deals is pro-cyclical, with high 
leverage peaking in the late 1980’s, the late 1990’s, and 2006-2007, and dropping in the early 1990’s, 
the early 2000’s and in 2008. Similar changes are found in the structure of the debt, with high leverage 
periods being associated with longer repayment periods and a smaller Term Loan A tranche (the part 
                                                 
3 An exception is Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), who look at the operating performance of LBOs that subsequently 
went public, including divisional buyouts as well as public-to-private transactions.  Unlike their sample, we do not require 
that our LBOs subsequently exited through a public offering.  
4 One exception is the contemporaneous study of Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (forthcoming), which analyzes U.S. public-to-




of the debt traditionally held by banks instead of other institutional investors).  In contrast to the 
procyclicality of buyout leverage, we find that a matched set of public firms if anything exhibits 
countercyclical leverage.  
Theoretically, one approach to understanding buyout capital structures is to use the frameworks 
that have been developed for public company capital structures. Since the decision-makers in a buyout 
have much sharper incentives than managers of typical large publicly-traded firms, it is plausible that 
capital  structure  theories  that  assume  a  value-maximizing  principal,  such  as  the  trade-off  theory, 
should find more support if tested on a sample of buyouts than on public firms.  Conversely, the strong 
cyclicality of buyouts together with the organizational structure of private equity, suggest that buyout 
financing could be driven by a different set of factors than those which affect capital structures of 
public corporations. For example, it is plausible that private equity sponsors are uniquely positioned to 
arbitrage debt markets versus equity markets due to superior access to debt financing, as suggested by 
Ivashina  and  Kovner  (2008)  and  Demiroglu  and  James  (forthcoming).    By  borrowing  cheap  and 
purchasing equity in firms, private equity sponsors can arbitrage the different conditions in the two 
markets.  Alternatively,  private  equity  sponsors  have  agency  problems  of  their  own,  which  could 
impact their choice of leverage in their portfolio companies. Axelson et al. (2009) present a model in 
which because of the option-like structure of compensation given to private equity sponsors, they have 
a tendency to overinvest, undertaking value-decreasing investments in addition to value-increasing 
ones.    Making  sponsors  capital-constrained,  so  that  they  need  to  raise  external  debt  in  order  to 
complete deals, gives limited partners some protection against this tendency. However, when access to 
debt is “easy”, private equity funds will nonetheless have an incentive to lever up as much as possible 
and to overpay for deals. Consistent with this argument, Kaplan and Stein (1993) provide evidence 
suggesting that the booming junk bond markets of the late 1980s led to an overheated private equity 
market, with low private equity fund returns as a consequence.
5 
To evaluate these potential explanations for leverage in buyout transactions, we examine the 
determinants of cross-sectional variation in leverage across buyouts and the extent to which it is related 
to cross-sectional patterns of public firms’ capital structures.  We first test whether leverage in buyouts 
is correlated with leverage in similar public firms. Very surprisingly (at least to us), there appears to be 
absolutely  no  relation  between  leverage  in  buyout  fims  and  leverage  in  comparable  public  firms, 
                                                 
5 Ljungqvist, Richardson, and Wolfenzon (2007) find that buyout funds accelerate their investment flows when credit 
market conditions loosen.  They do not address how the leverage or pricing of individual deals vary with credit market 
conditions,  however. M o r e  r e c e n t l y ,  G o r b e n k o  a n d  M a l e n k o  ( 2 0 0 9 )  p r e s e n t  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  b u y e r s  b i d  m o r e  




regardless of whether we measure leverage as the ratio of debt to enterprise value, debt as a multiple of 
cash flow (as proxied by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)), or 
interest coverage.   
There are two possible explanations for this lack of a relation.  First, it could be that the choice 
of leverage in buyouts is driven by completely different considerations than the choice of leverage in 
similar public firms.  Second, it is possible that our matching of buyouts to public firms is not accurate, 
for  example  because  buyouts  tend  to  be  targeted  at  firms  within  the  industry  that  have  very 
unrepresentative characteristics.   We perform a number of robustness checks to investigate the second 
explanation, such as matching our LBO sample to subsamples of public firms that have adjusted their 
leverage significantly over the last years, or are active debt issuers, but there nonetheless remains no 
relation  between  the  capital  structures  of  buyouts  and  comparable  public  firms.    In  addition,  we 
consider the subsample of 142 public-to-private deals for which we have information about pre-LBO 
financials.  In this subsample, there is no relationship between buyout leverage and pre-LBO leverage.  
However,  there  is  a  strong  cross-sectional  relation  between  pre-LBO  leverage  and  that  of  public 
matching firms, indicating that firms targeted by LBO sponsors do not differ systematically from 
industry norms in their capital structure before the buyout.  Finally, it could be that the LBO capital 
structures are intended to be temporary and that private equity funds over time pay down debt to 
approach a target capital structure that more closely resembles that of public firms.  We address this 
possibility by comparing public leverage to predicted LBO leverage in five years, using amortization 
schedules, and still find no relationship. These findings suggest that selection bias or bad matching is 
not the explanation for the lack of a relation between buyout capital structure and that of comparable 
public firms. 
Given that the amount of leverage used by buyouts and matched public firms have little or no 
relation, what does determine leverage in buyout firms?  We first consider a number of factors known 
to  affect  the  cross-sectional  pattern  of  leverage  in  public  firms,  such  as  profitability,  cash  flow 
volatility, and growth opportunities.  Similar to early studies, we find that for public firms, more 
profitable firms have lower leverage, firms with more variable cash flows have lower leverage, and 
firms with more growth opportunities have lower leverage.  In contrast to the matched public firms, 
none of these firm-specific characteristics are consistently related to LBO leverage levels. Instead, the 
only robust predictor of LBO leverage we find is the prevailing condition of debt markets; the higher 
the credit risk premium of leveraged loans, measured as the market leveraged loan spread over LIBOR, 




leverage for LBOs is that when rates are lower, firms can pay interest on a higher principal with the 
same cash flows.  But this explanation would apply to public firms as well, and public firm leverage is 
robustly positively related to the high-yield spread. It appears that, in contrast to public firms, the 
primary determinant of buyout leverage is not firm-specific, but rather the market-wide condition of 
the credit markets at the time of the buyout. 
General partners of private equity firms often state that the availability of leverage allows them 
to pay higher purchase prices for the firms they acquire.  We consider whether this prediction holds in 
our sample.  Because the deals in our sample are of dramatically different size, we use as our measure 
of price the total enterprise value at the time of the deal as a multiple of EBITDA of the firm.  Similar 
to the leverage equations, we control econometrically for market conditions using the pricing of public 
firms at the time of the buyout. Our results suggest that in contrast to the results for leverage, in which 
there was no relation between public firm and buyout firm leverage, there is a statistically significant, 
positive relationship between buyout pricing and the prices of comparable public firms.  However, 
buyout pricing is also strongly negatively related to current market interest rates on leveraged loans, 
even after controlling for prices in public markets. 
The finding that both leverage and pricing in buyouts are strongly dependent on credit market 
conditions could potentially be explained if variation in our high-yield spread variable simply picks up 
variation in the economy-wide discount rate.   When discount rates are low, real interest rates are low, 
so for a given level of EBITDA firms should be able to take on more debt and still be able to meet 
interest payments.  Similarly, when discount rates are low, price multiples should be high.  However, 
the discount rate effect on price multiples should be similar for our matched public firms.  Since the 
high-yield  spread  is  an  equally  strong  predictor  of  LBO  prices  after  controlling  for  public  firm 
multiples,  we  find  a  pure  discount  rate  explanation  implausible.    Instead,  the  results  are  more 
consistent  with  stories  in  which  the  extra  leverage  that  LBO  funds  take  on  when  credit  market 
conditions are good makes them willing to pay higher prices, over and above prevailing prices in 
public markets.  As discussed above, this effect could either be due to private equity funds being 
particularly proficient at arbitraging cheap debt against equity, or to agency problems between private 
equity sponsors and their investors. 
To distinguish between these explanations, we estimate the impact of leverage on fund returns.  
We first replicate the findings in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) on our sample of funds and find, similar to 
Kaplan and Schoar, that the return of a particular fund (measured by IRR) is positively related to the 




particular fund is negatively related to the return of that fund, controlling for other relevant factors, 
such as vintage year effects.  The effect is nonlinear; for leverage levels below the median there is no 
relation between leverage and fund returns, while the relation is robustly negative for above median 
leverage levels. This finding is robust to controls including industry, region, and LBO type fixed 
effects, sponsor fixed effects, and LBO year fixed effects, and provides support for an agency story in 
which private equity funds overpay for deals when they can lever up a lot.  To investigate whether 
funds make money by timing debt markets, we split leverage into the component of leverage explained 
by variation in debt markets and residual leverage.  If funds were able to arbitrage debt markets against 
equity markets when debt is “cheap”, we would expect the predicted component of leverage to have a 
positive impact on fund returns.  However, we instead find that both components of leverage have a 
negative impact on returns, which is inconsistent with a market-timing story.  Finally, also consistent 
with an agency story in which sponsor over-investment and risk-shifting hurts investors, we find that 
deals that are large relative to fund size predict negative fund returns. 
Our findings contribute to both the private equity literature and the capital structure literature.  
First, our findings contribute to the literature on private equity fund returns, e.g. Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005),  and  Gottschalg  and  Phalippou  (2009).    Our  contribution  here  is  to  document  how  excess 
leverage and deal size might have led to disappointing returns for many private equity funds.  
Our  paper  also  relates  to  the  literature  on  LBO  financial  distress.  Our  results  support  the 
arguments of Kaplan and Stein (1993) that hot credit markets can lead to excess leverage, which can in 
turn lead to high subsequent default rates.  Whether this imposes a major cost on the economy is an 
open question.  Some evidence, e.g. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Bernstein et al. (2010), suggests 
that these costs may not be particularly high, but more research is needed here. 
In terms of the broader capital structure literature, our paper is related to work by Berger et al. 
(1997) and others who analyze how the corporate governance of firms affects their capital structures. 
Our paper is also related to literature on market timing in capital structure (e.g. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), and Welch (2004)), and to the recent literature emphasizing the importance of supply-effects 
for leverage (e.g. Leary (2009)).  Our results suggest that taking advantage of market timing or excess 
supply of funds can actually be value-decreasing for firms when owners have agency issues of their 
own. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe how a 




capital structure.  Section IV describes our sample and the multiple sources from which we derive our 
data. Section V contains our empirical analysis, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  How are Private Equity Transactions Structured? 
 
In a private equity transaction, the private equity firm forms a new company (“newco”) to bid for a 
controlling  stake  in  –  and  often  majority  ownership  of  –  an  existing  company.  The  newco  is 
established specifically for the purposes of the transaction and is usually just a shell company with 
nominal capital and temporary directors. The private equity sponsor lines up debt financing, which is 
raised by newco conditional on the acquisition being consummated, and is backed by the target firm’s 
assets. Together with equity that the private equity fund raises from its investors, the private equity 
firm can purchase the target firm.
6  
In principle, a private equity sponsor could finance a transaction entirely using the equity raised 
from investors in its own fund(s), similarly to the way in which early-stage venture capital investments 
are conducted.  However, private equity buyouts are predominately financed with debt rather than 
equity. This debt financing is typically provided through the syndicated loan market.
7 Given that in a 
private equity buyout, each bidder must have secured sufficient funds to complete the transaction 
within a few days if they successfully negotiate a deal, bond financing, involving a prospectus and 
various regulatory hurdles, usually takes too long to be a feasible as an initial source of capital.
8  
The debt structure in buyouts has become fairly standardized, yet is far more complicated than 
is typically described in academic discussions.
9 In Table 1 we present an example of one of the private 
equity transactions in our sample, the purchase of the U.K. tire and exhaust-fitting company Kwik-Fit 
in 2005. This transaction used a capital structure that was typical for buyouts conducted at that time 
and as such, we discuss this financial structure in some detail.  
Kwik-Fit was bought by private equity house PAI for an enterprise value of £773.5m. The 
purchase was financed using £191m of equity (provided by funds advised by PAI) and £582.5m of 
debt. The initial debt/equity ratio of the newco was therefore 75% debt and 25% equity, which is 
typical for the buyouts in our sample. The debt was structured into senior and subordinated tranches. 
                                                 
6 If the bid is unsuccessful, newco is disbanded and the debt is never issued. 
7  Reflecting a rather curious use of terminology, this market is increasingly known as the “leveraged loan” market.  
8 In some cases, however, syndicated loans are refinanced at a later stage using a public bond issue.  
9 A notable exception is Cotter and Peck (2001), who provide a detailed description of the debt structure of 64 U.S. public-




The senior debt was divided into three separate term loans of roughly equal sizes but with different 
maturities, payment schedules and seniorities. One tranche, called Term Loan A, had a 7-year maturity 
and was amortizing, while Term Loans B and C were not amortizing, with the principal being repaid in 
a final “bullet” payment at the end of the term (or at redemption if earlier).  In addition to the term 
loans, the company obtained a revolving credit facility and a capex facility both of which, if drawn, 
would rank as senior debt.  
In  addition  to  the  senior  debt  and  facilities,  newco  was  financed  with  two  tranches  of 
subordinated debt: a 2
nd lien tranche of £75m, which was senior to a mezzanine tranche of £97.5m. 2
nd 
lien tranches started to appear in buyouts during 2004, and are now a very common feature of buyouts’ 
capital structures. The interest payments on mezzanine debt include cash interest of 4.5%, together 
with “pay-in-kind” interest of an additional 5%.
10  
 
III.  The Financial Structure and Pricing of LBOs and Public Firms: Theoretical Roadmap 
 
In this section, we describe in more detail the theoretical frameworks that provide us with testable 
implications about the factors affecting leverage and pricing in buyouts and public firms. 
A.  The Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Capital Structure 
Perhaps the most commonly used explanation for leverage is the trade-off theory, in which capital 
structure is chosen so that the tax and incentive advantages of debt exactly offset bankruptcy costs at 
the margin (see Myers (2001)).  The trade-off theory is often augmented with some version of the 
pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), in which the issuance of securities is costly due to 
information asymmetries, leading firms to stray from the optimal target leverage suggested by the pure 
trade-off theory. 
Both the trade-off and the pecking order theories suggest that the capital structure of a firm 
should be tailored to the characteristics of that firm’s assets.  For example, profitable firms with stable 
cashflows should have high leverage, since they are better at utilizing debt tax shields and have lower 
probabilities of financial distress, and costs of financial distress are likely to be higher for firms with 
more investment opportunities and more intangible assets.   
                                                 
10 Pay-in-kind interest means that instead of cash, the holders of the mezzanine debt are issued additional notes equal to the 




The pecking order theory predicts that firms that have historically been more profitable, so that 
they have not needed to issue securities to finance investments, will end up with lower leverage, even 
if the pure tradeoff theory would suggest that more profitable firms should take advantage of debt tax 
shields  and  incentive  benefits.    The  pecking  order  argument  is  less  likely  to  explain  leverage  in 
buyouts than in public firms since buyout leverage is calculated at the time of the transaction, so there 
will have been no time for the firm to drift away from the target capital structure.  Nonetheless, if both 
LBO sponsors and managers of public firms act according to the trade-off theory, we would expect 
that there should be a relation between LBO leverage and the leverage of public firms with similar 
characteristics.    We  test  this  idea  below,  and  also  relate  LBO  and  public  firm  leverage  to  firm 
characteristics,  the  idea  being  that  according  to  the  tradeoff  theory,  the  same  firm-level  factors 
determine leverage at the margin for both buyout and public firms, so changing one of these factors 
should have the same effect for both types of firms.   
B.  Market Timing  
Baker  and  Wurgler  (2002),  among  others,  suggest  that  managers  attempt  to  take  advantage  of 
mispricing  in  equity  markets  when  issuing  securities.    Similarly,  it  is  possible  that  debt  markets 
periodically become “overheated”, so that investors do not demand the full interest rate corresponding 
to the fundamental underlying risk of a firm.  Managers aware of this market imperfection should take 
advantage of it, and issue more debt when the debt markets are overvalued.
11  The market-timing 
hypothesis is also consistent with the stated view of many private equity practitioners, who often argue 
that one of the ways in which private equity funds make money is by increasing leverage of deals in 
response to hot credit market conditions to arbitrage the conditions between debt and equity markets.
12  
If the market-timing story is true, buyout leverage should respond more to debt market conditions than 
to the firm characteristics suggested by the trade-off theory, and they should also be willing to pay 
higher prices when debt financing is “cheap”.  This pattern would also hold for public firms, unless 
private  equity  sponsors  are  better  at  timing  debt  markets  than  the  managers  of  stand-alone  firms. 
Importantly, to the extent that the competition for deals between buyout funds is not strong enough to 
pass on all the value increase from cheap debt to target shareholders, the market-timing hypothesis also 
                                                 
11 Related to this argument, the results in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) suggest that public firms use debt market 
conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow. 
12 For example, Guy Hands, a partner at Terra Firma, stated: “We buy stuff with cheap debt and arbitrage on the difference 




predicts that fund returns should be higher when the private equity sponsors are able to use higher 
leverage to finance individual deals. 
 
C. GP-LP Agency Conflicts 
Just as there are agency problems between CEOs and owners that can explain leverage choices for 
public  firms,  there  are  potential  agency  problems  between  the  private  equity  fund  managers  (the 
“GPs”) and the investors in the fund (the “LPs”) that could explain leverage choices in buyouts.  In 
particular, because of the limited liability of GPs and the option-like carry contract they hold on fund 
returns, GPs may sometimes have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the fund by investing a large 
fraction of fund money in one big deal.
13  Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2009) provide a model 
in which these overinvestment tendencies of GPs are mitigated by capital constraints, so that it is 
optimal to require GPs to go to external capital markets and raise debt whenever they want to make an 
investment.  When liquidity in debt markets is high and/or interest rates are low, GPs can add more 
leverage to their deals and invest more aggressively, increasing the value of their option and making 
them willing to overpay for deals relative to fundamental value.  Similar to the market-timing theory, 
this agency story predicts that buyout leverage would be driven more by debt market conditions than 
by the characteristics of the underlying portfolio firm.  The agency story, in contrast to the market-
timing story, predicts that increased leverage can very well hurt investors in private equity funds, so 
that higher leverage should lead to lower fund returns on average. 
Although Axelson et al. (2009) do not formally model GPs’ reputations, an extension of their 
model would also imply that GPs with less reputational capital at stake should be more prone to 
overinvestment.
14  In the equations we estimate below, we therefore include proxies for GP reputation. 
 
                                                 
13 The typical contract between GPs and LPs in a buyout fund is that GPs get a “carried interest” of 20% of all profits (after 
fees borne by investors) provided the rate of return (as measured by IRR on invested capital) exceeds a stipulated hurdle 
rate; but the GPs earn no carried interest if the fund does not exceed the hurdle rate. 




IV.  Data Description 
 
A.  Data Sources and Sample Selection. 
Our sample selection primarily relies on two commercial databases: Capital IQ and LPC/Dealscan. We 
use the Capital IQ database to construct a base sample of private equity transactions. The base sample 
contains all private placement and M&A transactions in Capital IQ where the list of acquirers includes 
(at least) one investment firm that has a reported investment interest in one of the following stages: 
Seed/startup, Early venture, Emerging growth, Growth capital, Bridge, Turnaround, Middle market, 
Mature, Buyout, Mid-venture, Late venture, Industry consolidation, Mezzanine/subdebt, Incubation, 
Recapitalization, or PIPES. From this sample, we select all M&A transactions classified as ‘leveraged 
buyout,’ ‘management buyout,’ or ‘going private’ that were announced between January 1986 and July 
2008. Capital IQ contains information on the details of the transaction, such as the buyers and sellers, 
the target company identity, transaction size, and for a subset there is financial information such as 
EBITDA (primarily for public-to-private transactions and LBOs involving public bond issues).
15   
From the sample of Capital IQ buyouts we construct a list of all private equity firms that appear 
as  acquirers  in  at  least  five  LBO  transactions.  For  each  of  these  private  equity  firms  we  extract 
information from the LPC/Dealscan database on all syndicated loans for which one of these firms acts 
as a sponsor, producing a total of 5678 loans.  From this list we exclude loans that did not back the 
original leveraged buyout transaction (i.e. refinancings and recapitalizations as well as loans financing 
subsequent add-on acquisitions by the LBO target), ending up with 2467 LBO loans.   
Since Dealscan coverage improves substantially in the late 1990’s, we were able to match a 
larger fraction of the recent deals of these funds.  In addition, there is likely a bias in our sample 
towards larger deals, which are more likely to use syndicated debt than are smaller deals. Dealscan 
provides information primarily on the bank loan portion of the capital structure, but using the deal 
descriptions provided by Dealscan and Capital IQ, we also find information on other types of debt such 
as vendor financing, assumed debt, bonds, as well as equity used in the deal.  We also use Capital IQ, 
SDC, Mergent, and Edgar filings to track down additional public bond issues. In a handful of cases, we 
infer information about additional subordinated debt from the difference between total debt and senior 
debt ratios in Dealscan.  
                                                 




To calculate our capital structure variables we also require information on the EBITDA of the 
LBO  target  at  the  time  of  the  buyout.    For  649  observations  this  information  is  included  in  the 
Dealscan data, either explicitly or implicitly in terms of a multiple of total debt, or senior debt, to 
EBITDA.  Using Capital IQ, Compustat, and Bureau Van Dyke’s Amadeus database, we are able to 
find EBITDA information for another 425 observations.  
Finally, we supplement our sample with the Kaplan (1989a, b) sample of 83 buyouts from the 
1980s.  These buyouts predated the development of the syndicated loan market, so would clearly not 
have entered our sample otherwise.
16  After this process, we end up with a sample of 1157 buyout 
observations between 1980 and 2008. 
An important part of our analysis is to match these private equity buyouts with comparable 
publicly quoted companies. For public company financial information, we use the Compustat North 
America and Compustat Global databases to calculate matched median financial characteristics for 
public companies in the same year, region (North America, Western Europe, and Rest of World), and 
industry  as  the  corresponding  buyout  transaction.    We  rely  on  the  Fama  and  French  (1997) 
classification of firms into 49 industries. We date the buyout by the closing date of the syndicated loan 
package, as reported by Dealscan. 
Our analysis also requires information about debt market conditions and other macroeconomic 
variables. Our debt market condition variables include the U.S. high-yield spread, defined as the U.S. 
high-yield  rate  for  the  corresponding  month  according  to  the  Merrill  Lynch  High-Yield  index 
(obtained through Datastream) minus U.S. LIBOR (obtained from the British Bankers’ Association); 
the  S&P  Earnings/Price  ratio  (obtained  from  Compustat)  minus  the  high-yield  rate,  and  a  credit 
tightening measure, obtained from the Federal Reserve.
17 We also obtain inflation and exchange rates 
from the IMF.
18 
Finally, we calculate various private equity sponsor characteristics, such as number of funds 
raised,  fund  sizes,  and  fund  returns  (IRRs).    Data  on  a  fund’s  inception  date, s i z e ,  and  sequence 
number relative to other funds raised by the same sponsor are constructed by combining observations 
from  Capital  IQ  and  Preqin,  both  of  which  provide  independently  collected  and  somewhat  non-
                                                 
16 We are very grateful to Steve Kaplan for providing us with this data. 
17 We use the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices survey, which is conducted quarterly by the 
US  Federal  Reserve  Board  (source: h t t p : / / w w w . f e d e r a l r e s e r v e . g o v / b o a r d d o c s / S n l o a n S u r v e y / ).  We  focus  on  the  net 
percentage of domestic loan officers at medium and large banks reporting a tightening of standards for loans. 
18 We have also used average spreads on leveraged loans for the U.S. and European markets over LIBOR, obtained from 
Standard & Poor’s.  We were only able to obtain these from 1997 and onwards, but for this period the results are virtually 




overlapping data on these variables.  Preqin has data on 9,523 buyout and venture funds as of June 
2009, and is also our source for fund returns. Preqin claims to cover about 70% of all capital ever 
raised in the private equity industry. Traditional sources of data on private equity returns rely on self-
reporting by GPs and/or LPs and are likely to suffer from sample selection biases. However, 85% of 
the data gathered by Preqin is allegedly collected via Freedom of Information Act requests and should 
not be subject to self-reporting biases. 
Direct information about which exact fund each deal belongs to is only available in about a 
third of the cases (through Capital IQ).  When this information is not available, we match a deal to the 
sponsor fund that was actively investing in the time period and region of the deal.  We match 1099 out 
of our 1157 deals to a particular fund.  The unmatched deals are done by sponsors who do not use a 
fund structure for their investments.  
B.  Sample Characteristics and Representativeness 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on our sample.  Panel A indicates that the sample contains 1157 
buyouts, of which 694 (60%) are of North American firms, 463 (39%) are of Western European firms, 
and 10 (1%) are of firms located in the rest of the world.  In contrast to previous papers that have 
focused on U.S. deals, our sample is more representative of the universe of all buyouts.  Still, our 
sample  overweights  U.S.  buyouts  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  in  the  universe  of  buyouts 
reported in Capital IQ, 47% are from North America, 45% are from Western Europe, and 8% are from 
the rest of the world.
20  This bias is due to two reasons.  First, our sample selection relies on Dealscan 
for capital structure information, which mainly covers syndicated bank loans.  Deals outside of U.S. 
and Western Europe tend to be smaller and therefore rarely use syndicated loans.  Second, our 1980s 
deals are taken from Kaplan (1989 a,b), whose sample is restricted to  U.S. buyouts. 
 Unlike most previous research, our sample is not restricted to public-to-private deals. It does 
contain 368 (32%) public-to-private buyouts, but also contains 167 (14%) buyouts of independent 
companies, 320 (28%) divisional buyouts, and 293 (25%) buyouts of firms already owned by other 
private  equity  firms,  called  secondary  buyouts  (see  Table  2,  Panel  A).    Because  our  sampling 
procedure tends to overweight large deals relative to small ones, our sample is still somewhat biased 
towards public-to-private deals compared to the underlying population of buyouts according to Capital 
IQ,  where  public-to-private  deals  only  account  for  6.5%  of  transactions.  Similarly,  our  procedure 
                                                 




under-samples buyouts of (on average smaller) independent private companies, which make up just 
14% of our sample compared to 46.8% of the deals on Capital IQ.  
Panel A of Table 2 also reveals that around 75% of our sample transactions occurred between 
2001 and 2008, compared to 63% in the Capital IQ population.  Again, this is probably indicative of 
the syndicated bank loan market becoming significantly more active over the last decade. 
Panels A and B of Appendix Table 1 contain detailed breakdowns of the sample by country, 
industry, and the identity of the sponsoring firm.  In addition to the U.S., the U.K. and France are the 
most common countries represented. The sample is widely distributed across industries, with no one 
industry representing more than 10%.  It is also widely distributed in terms of the sponsoring buyout 
firm;  Kohlberg,  Kravis  and  Roberts  is  the  most  common  sponsor,  with  61  deals,  but  still  only 
represents 5.3% of the total sample.  
Panel B of Table 2 examines the deals’ size. As expected, our sample clearly contains very 
large deals; the average (median) LBO enterprise value is just over $1.6 billion 2008 U.S. dollars 
($683 million) compared to an average (median) of $330 million ($63 million) for the entire Capital IQ 
sample.  Public-to-private deals are the largest, averaging over $2.5 billion in enterprise value, and 
include the sample’s largest deal, KKR’s buyout of RJR-Nabisco (enterprise value of $59.5 billion 
when measured in 2008 dollars).  In contrast, independent private deals are the smallest type of deal in 
our sample, but still average over $600m in enterprise value. 
To  summarize,  although  our  sample  is  more  representative  of  the  buyout  population  than 
samples  used  in  other  studies,  it  overweights  large  deals,  public-to-private  transactions,  U.S. 
transactions, and more recent buyouts, because of our reliance on the syndicated bank loan market for 
capital structure information.  In our tests, our main results are robust to controlling for region, buyout 
type, and size, and we cluster our standard errors by deal year in our regressions.  Nonetheless, the 
extent to which our conclusions hold equally for smaller buyout transactions that do not rely on the 
syndicated loan market for debt financing is an issue we leave for future research. 
 
V.  Results 
A.  Leverage of buyout firms 
Table 3 details the complicated debt structure found in our sample. Consistent with the Kwik-Fit deal 
analysed earlier, bank debt is typically divided into amortizing Term Loan A, which is usually held by 
the originating bank, and bullet payment Term Loans B, C etc. that are often securitized or sold to 




Loan A), while 89.3% use bullet debt (Term Loan B).  The use of amortizing debt declined noticeably 
in the years leading up to the financial crisis as lenders were increasingly prepared to lend on a non-
amortizing basis.  Table 3 also presents the fraction of debt financing accounted for by each type; 
amortizing  bank  debt  averages  23.4%  of  total  debt  while  bullet  debt  comprises  46.2%.    Other 
important sources of debt are mezzanine (9.9%) and junior bonds (9.3%).   
In some transactions loans are provided by the private equity fund itself (“Sponsor loans”), or 
by the seller in the buyout transaction (“Vendor loans”), and existing loans are sometimes retained 
rather than refinanced (“Assumed debt”). As Table 3 shows, these loans are, on average, not very 
significant, representing in total around 2.5% of total debt financing. We also observe preferred equity 
in a few deals, which may have more or less debt-like features, but we do not include preferred equity 
in our definition of debt. 
Throughout  our  analysis  we  distinguish  between  “regular”  or  non-contingent  debt,  and 
contingent debt, such as revolving credit facilities, capital expenditure and acquisition lines of credit, 
or stand-by letters of credit. Most of the contingent debt is not drawn at the time of the transaction, but 
rather intended for future funding of working capital, add-on acquisitions or other types of  investment. 
We do not include contingent debt in our definition of total debt when calculating our leverage ratios 
(debt to enterprise value, debt to EBITDA, and interest coverage), since the draw-down of contingent 
debt would be concurrent with a subsequent investment in the firm, which in turn would involve a 
change in enterprise value and EBITDA. As is indicated in Table 3, buyouts use substantial quantities 
of  contingent  debt;  these  additional  facilities  amount  to  nearly  18%  of  the  value  of  total  (non-
contingent) debt. 
Table 3 also documents the spreads on the debt and the proportion of the debt that is due in less 
than 5 years.  Not surprisingly, the senior debt (the term loans and revolving credit facilities) has a 
substantially smaller spread than the junior debt.  Also, the effect of amortization is clear: the majority 
of the Term Loan A and the bridge loans have to be paid off in less than 5 years but a very small 
fraction of all the other types of debt are due that quickly. The maturity, and sometimes also the 
spread, is often missing for vendor and sponsor loans in our sample.  When we need these to calculate 
leverage ratios we assume that (a) the interest rate on these loans equals the local LIBOR rate plus the 
U.S. high-yield spread over U.S. LIBOR, and (b) that the debt is non-amortizing.  Although these 
assumptions are somewhat arbitrary, they have very little impact on our results given the small fraction 




Table 4 documents the quantities of leverage used in the transactions as well as the pricing of 
the buyout deals. We use three different measures of leverage: total debt divided by earnings before 
interest and depreciation (“D/EBITDA”), total debt divided by enterprise value (“D/EV”) and interest 
on debt divided by EBITDA (“I/EBITDA”).
21,22 Our main measure of deal pricing is enterprise value 
divided by EBITDA.
23 As expected, LBOs are indeed highly leveraged.  The average deal in the 
sample raises 69% of its capital through debt of various forms and has ratios of debt to EBITDA and 
interest to EBITDA of 5.6 and 0.5 respectively.  The EV/EBITDA-multiple paid is 8.2 for the average 
transaction.  Public-to-private deals are the most highly levered, with 73% of capital raised through 
debt and a D/EBITDA ratio of 6.5.  They are also the highest priced transactions, with an average 8.8 
EV/EBITDA multiple.  Table 4 also shows significant univariate variation for leverage and pricing 
across geographies and size groups, with U.S. deals and larger deals (measured by enterprise value in 
2008 U.S. dollars) having higher leverage and pricing multiples. 
Table 4 also reveals significant changes in capital structure across time. These time trends are 
illustrated graphically in Panel A of Figure 1. From the start of our sample in the early 1980’s, debt 
and valuation levels peaked in the late 1980’s, decreased until the mid-1990’s, increased in the late 
1990’s, fell in the early 2000’s, and increased again in the 2005-2007 period.  Strikingly, leverage 
(especially D/EBITDA) and pricing multiples track each other very closely, as is particularly clear 
from the graph in Panel A of Figure 1.  Also, the time periods when leverage and pricing drops most 
significantly coincide with the fall of the junk-bond market in 1989-1990 and the internet crash in 
2000-2001, while leverage peaks at the top of the business cycles in 1988, 1998, and 2007.
24 This 
suggests that macro-economic conditions affect both leverage and pricing of LBOs in a highly pro-
cyclical manner. 
It is worth noting, however, that there is a decreasing trend in debt to enterprise value over our 
sample period, with an average D/EV of over 80% in each sub-period before 1994 and below 70% 
following 1995. One partial explanation for this trend is that many of the 1980s deals involved selling 
                                                 
21 As mentioned in Section IV, we obtain EBITDA either from Dealscan or from pre-LBO financial statements. One 
concern is that the former EBITDA numbers could sometimes be pro-forma numbers or forward-looking projections.  We 
have re-run our analysis for the subsamples with different sources, and our results are qualitatively the same. 
22 The I/EBITDA measure is calculated using total interest expense, including non-cash Pay-In-Kind (PIK) interest.  While 
it may make sense to use a measure based on cash interest only, the information on the amount of PIK interest is missing 
for a large fraction of our sample. 
23 We have also used enterprise value divided by sales as an alternative pricing measure, with similar results.  Sales 
numbers are missing for a large number of our observations, however. 
24  Note that we have very few observations, between 0 and 3 per year, for the 1990-1993 period.  Hence, the large 




off parts of the acquired company, the proceeds of which could be used to repay some of the debt (see 
Kaplan, 1989b).  
B.  Comparisons with Public Companies 
As noted earlier, the literature has devoted considerable attention to financing choices, but almost 
always in the context of publicly traded corporations.  In Section III, we argued that factors that affect 
capital structure in public companies could potentially apply to LBOs as well.  In addition, other 
theories such as the market timing or the GP-LP agency-based explanations described above suggest 
that private equity firms could have different motivations for the choice of leverage in their portfolio 
companies than do publicly-traded companies.
25  
To evaluate the extent to which common theories explain leverage in public companies and 
LBOs,  we  compare  leverage  choices  in  the  buyouts  in  our  sample  with  those  in  similar  public 
companies. If the same theories explain leverage in both types of organization, we should observe 
common factors predicting leverage in both.  
To perform this comparison, we construct a sample of public companies that are as similar as 
possible to the sample of LBOs.  For each LBO, we take as a matching characteristic the median 
industry value among the public companies in the Global Compustat database in the same year, same 
region (North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia) and same Fama-French 
industry (using their 49-industry classification) as the LBO.
26  
For the public companies we calculate the corresponding measures of leverage and pricing as 
we used for the buyouts, i.e. D/EV, D/EBITDA, I/EBITDA, and EV/EBITDA.  For public company 
debt (“D”) we use total long-term debt (including debt due within one year) minus cash and short-term 
investments. For enterprise value (“EV”) we use market value of equity plus long-term debt minus 
cash and short-term investment.  For interest (“I”) we use interest expense minus interest income.  We 
calculate  matched  medians  for  D/EBITDA  and  I/EBITDA  for  all  public  companies  in  the  same 
industry and region using the fiscal year that precedes the closing date of the LBO syndicated loan.  
When calculating matched EV/EBITDA and D/EV, we use the market value of equity for the public 
                                                 
25 Indeed, if one asks practitioners how they make leverage choices, the typical answers will differ substantially.  When 
asked about capital structure policy, a typical CFO of a public company will usually discuss the importance of maintaining 
financial flexibility and express concern over distress costs (see Graham and Harvey (2001)), while a partner of a buyout 
firm will often say that they inject as much debt into their LBOs as possible to maximize the expected return on their equity 
investment. 
26 The  Fa ma -French industry classification was first introduced in Fama and French (1997) and has been updated in 
subsequent work.  We used the most recent industry classification as of January 2009 according to Kenneth French’s web 




companies in the matched industry-region for the month preceding the closing of the buyout loan, and 
use the blended averages of EBITDA, cash and long-term debt for the fiscal years preceding and 
following the buyout loan closing date.
27 We exclude public companies with negative EBITDA when 
calculating the industry-region-date median values of D/EBITDA, EV/EBITDA and I/EBITDA.    
Panel  B  of  Figure  1  illustrates  graphically  the  evolution  of  leverage  and  pricing  over  our 
sample period for the matched public company medians.  The patterns for matched public companies 
show very little resemblance to the patterns documented for the LBO sample in Panel A.  First, not 
surprisingly, public companies have significantly lower leverage, with a D/EV ranging between 30-
50%  for  most  years,  compared  to  65-90%  for  the  buyouts.    Second,  the  time  series  variation  is 
strikingly different.  The strong positive relation between D/EBITDA and EV/EBITDA that was seen 
for the buyouts is not observed for public companies. Furthermore, in contrast to the pro-cyclical 
pattern for buyouts, public company leverage appears counter-cyclical, peaking in the early 1990’s 
recession and again after the internet crash in 2000-2001.  The counter-cyclical leverage of public 
companies is consistent with earlier research, such as Korajczyk and Levy (2003).   
Still, the lack of a relation in the time-series does not necessarily rule out a cross-sectional 
relation between public and buyout leverage. Panel A of Table 5 performs the following experiment: it 
sorts the matched public company median values into quartiles based on each of the three measures of 
leverage. It then presents the medians of the leverage measures for the corresponding buyouts in each 
of the public company quartiles. If the same factors determine leverage for both groups of companies, 
then the pattern of leverage across quartiles should be similar.  Note that this approach focuses on the 
cross-sectional pattern of capital structures; even if the buyouts all have higher leverage, there should 
still be a positive cross-sectional relation, if factors related to industry and location have any effect on 
leverage choices. 
By construction, leverage of the public companies increases with the quartile’s rank. Public 
company D/EV ranges from a median value of 0.19 in the lowest quartile to 0.54 in the highest 
quartile.  However, for the corresponding buyouts there is virtually no difference in leverage across the 
public company quartiles, with a range of 0.69 to 0.71. The lack of relationship also applies using the 
D/EBITDA measure of leverage. Whereas the public company medians increase across the quartiles 
                                                 
27 For example, suppose a buyout closes in March 2000.  For all publicly traded companies in the same industry and region, 
we first calculate the market value of equity at the end of February 2000. For simplicity assume that these publicly traded 
companies have fiscal years ending December 31. We then calculate blended values of long-term debt, cash, and EBITDA 
using a weight of 3/12 for the preceding fiscal year-end of December 31, 1999, and 9/12 for the following fiscal year-end of 
December 31, 2000. We then match the buyout with the median values of EV/EBITDA and D/EV across the publicly 




from 2.7 to 5.2, for the buyouts leverage actually decreases, from a median of 5.4 in quartile one to 4.8 
in quartile four, with the difference across quartiles being statistically significant. Finally, using the 
I/EBITDA  measure,  the  first  three  quartiles  of  buyouts  show  little  variation  in  terms  of  median 
leverage; only the group of buyouts corresponding to the most levered public companies have higher 
I/EBITDA.  
Figure 2 illustrates the (lack of a) relationship between LBO and public company leverage by 
plotting LBO leverage for each transaction against the matched public company median leverage. 
Again,  for  D/EV  there  is  basically  no  relation  (with  an  R-squared  of  0.004),  for  D/EBITDA  the 
relationship is slightly negative (with an R-squared of 0.005), and only for I/EBITDA do we see a 
slightly positive relationship (with a t-statistic of 1.78 and an R-squared of 0.021).  
These results suggest that there is virtually no relation between leverage in buyouts and in 
matched public companies. However, it is possible that there is in fact such a relation in the data but 
our  matching  process  is  so  inaccurate  that  we  fail  to  detect  it.  We  explore  a  number  of  possible 
hypotheses related to matching in Panels B through E in Table 5. 
First, the leverage at the time of the LBO transaction could be unrepresentative of the firm’s 
target capital structure.  In a typical LBO, the excess cash flow that the firm is generating is used to 
pay down acquisition debt over time.  Hence, it may be that private equity firms intend to reach the 
LBO’s target at some point in the future, which implies that this future leverage is a better measure of 
the firm’s optimal capital structure.  To address this possibility, we estimate predicted debt and interest 
expense five years after the LBO transaction using debt amortization schedules.  We then calculate 
D/EV, D/EBITDA, and I/EBITDA based on predicted D and I.  Since we do not have predictions of 
future EV and EBITDA, we normalize with EV and EBITDA at the time of the transaction. We then 
compare  these  predicted  leverage  ratios  to  matched  public  company  median  leverage  ratios.    The 
results, displayed in Panel B in Table 5, show that there is virtually no relation between predicted LBO 
leverage and public leverage either and the results are very similar to those in panel A (although LBO 
leverage ratios are approximately 20% lower on average).  
Second,  it  is  possible  that  the  median  public  companies  are  not  at  their  optimal  capital 
structure.  If firms incur transaction costs when adjusting capital structures, they would only do such 
adjustments infrequently. Consequently, a randomly picked public company could have drifted away 
from  its  optimal  capital  structure  at  the  time  when  the  sample  was  performed.
28  To  address  this 
                                                 
28 See e.g. Fisher et al (1989) and Strebulaev (2007) for theoretical models of costly adjustment, and Leary and Roberts 




possibility, we consider an alternative set of matched firms, which are restricted to public companies 
that have adjusted their capital structures in a given year with a change in debt to book assets of more 
than  ten  percentage  points  in  absolute  value.    For  this  “adjuster”  sample  we  calculate  matched 
industry-region-year median values of leverage as before. Panel C of Table 5 sorts buyouts using 
leverage quartiles for the adjuster sample.  The results are very similar to those obtained before; there 
is no statistically significant relation between public company leverage and LBO leverage.  
Third, we compare our buyouts to a sub-sample of public companies that actually use leverage. 
Starting with Jensen (1986), researchers have argued that managers are averse to debt and companies 
with entrenched managers will therefore have lower leverage than what is optimal for shareholders.
29  
Also, even absent agency problems, some companies within the same industry could actually have 
higher debt capacity (e.g. due to lower costs of financial distress) than others, and it may be that 
buyouts are more similar to this group. To investigate this, we calculate industry-region-year median 
leverage using the subset of  public companies that have issued significant amounts of  debt – the  
“issuer” sample – which we define as companies whose ratio of long-term debt to book assets has 
increased by more than ten percentage points in a given year.
30 Panel D of Table 5 sorts buyouts using 
leverage quartiles for the issuer sample. For D/EV and D/EBITDA there is again no relation between 
buyout leverage and public company leverage, although there is a significant positive relation for 
I/EBITDA.  Overall, the relation between buyout and debt-issuing public company leverage is weak. 
Finally, and related to the previous point, there may be significant heterogeneity in the debt 
capacity of companies even within an industry-region-year match.  Given that LBO transactions rely 
on the ability of the company to take on debt, it is possible (or even likely) that private equity sponsors 
select targets within an industry and region that have particularly high debt capacity.
31 Unfortunately, 
we do not observe pre-LBO characteristics for the majority of firms in our sample since they were 
private at the time of the LBO.  Of the firms that were publicly traded before the buyout, we were able 
to find pre-LBO financial information for a subsample of 166 firms that were purchased in public-to-
private transactions.  For this subsample, we calculate leverage ratios using the last financial statement 
available in Global Compustat before the LBO transaction date.  The upper half of Panel E of Table 5 
                                                 
29  See Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) for evidence that firms with entrenched managers use less leverage. 
30 We have also used a match based on the 75% leverage percentile of matched public firms in the same industry-region-
year with similar results. 
31 For a sample of U.S. 1980’s public-to-private transactions Opler and Titman (1993) argue that LBO targets have worse 
investment opportunities and lower financial distress costs than other public firms. Stuart and Kim (forthcoming) confirm 
these  findings  using  a  more  recent  sample,  and  find  in  addition  that  companies  that  have  directors  with  prior  LBO 




sorts buyouts according to quartiles of pre-LBO leverage.  For D/EBITDA there is again no relation 
between pre-LBO and LBO leverage, and for I/EBITDA the result is very weak (and completely 
driven by the upper quartile of pre-LBO companies).  There is, however, a positive (and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level) relation for D/EV, although the LBO leverage distribution is much 
narrower (ranging from 0.63 to 0.77 across pre-LBO quartiles) than the pre-LBO leverage distribution 
(ranging from 0.11 to 0.97).   
In contrast to the view that LBO targets are selected because of their debt capacity, pre-LBO 
companies have rather similar leverage to their public peers, indicating that selection issues may be 
minor.  This comparison is presented in the lower half of Panel E, where pre-LBO leverage is sorted 
across  matched  public  company  industry-country-date  median  leverage  quartiles.    For  all  three 
leverage  measures,  there  is  a  significant  positive  relation  between  pre-LBO  and  median  industry 
leverage, and the inter-quartile ranges are of roughly similar magnitudes.  Interestingly, LBO targets 
do not appear significantly more levered pre-LBO compared to their public peers (median D/EV is 
somewhat higher, while median D/EBITDA is somewhat lower and median I/EBITDA is identical).  
Although we cannot completely rule out selection based on unobserved factors, our results suggest that 
the failure to find a relation between LBO and public company leverage is not primarily due to private 
equity firms selecting  targets with particularly high debt capacity. 
C.  LBO leverage and company characteristics. 
The results so far suggest that there is no correlation between the leverage used in buyouts and that in 
comparable public companies. We now take the comparison to a more detailed level by investigating 
the extent to which firm-level characteristics are related to leverage in the two sets of firms.  We focus 
on characteristics that are plausible proxies for factors suggested by the trade-off or pecking order 
theories,  and  that  have  been  found  in  previous  research  to  be  associated  with  the  cross-sectional 
variation in capital structure for public companies.
32 To proxy for investment opportunities, we use 
market-to-book ratios, R&D-to-sales ratios, and sales growth, all of which should be negatively related 
to leverage according to the trade-off theory.  To proxy for profitability, we use return on invested 
capital (ROIC), which should be positively related to debt tax shields and incentive benefits of debt 
according to the trade-off theory, but negatively related to leverage according to the pecking order 
theory.  To proxy for risk, we use volatility in ROIC, which should be negatively related to leverage 
since it decreases debt tax shields and increases costs of financial distress.  To proxy for intangibility 
                                                 




of  assets,  which  should  increase  costs  of  financial  distress,  we  use  sales  to  property,  plant  and 
equipment (PPE) ratios. Finally, we relate leverage to statutory corporate tax rates, which should be 
positively related to the benefits of utilizing a debt tax shields.  
Continuing the approach adopted in Table 5, in each case we sort the matched public company 
industry-region-date medians by the variable in question, then present median leverage by quartile for 
the public companies and their buyout matches. The results are presented in Table 6 and suggest, in 
general, that, consistent with previous research, these factors tend to be related to capital structure for 
public  companies.  For  example,  market-to-book  and  R&D-to-sales  ratios  are  negatively  related  to 
leverage ratios, as most studies have found.  Yet, for the corresponding buyouts, there is no such 
relation between leverage and the ranking of the public comparables for either of these ratios.  If 
anything, if there is any relation between firm characteristics and LBO leverage, it tends to go in the 
opposite direction of public firms.  This pattern holds for market-to-book ratios and for sales growth, 
both  of  which  are  positively  correlated  with  LBO  Debt/EBITDA  and  Interest/EBITDA  ratios  and 
negatively  correlated  with  public  firm  leverage.    The  one  variable  for  which  buyouts  and  public 
companies’  capital  structures  have  a  similar  pattern  is  the  corporate  tax  rate,  which  is  weakly 
correlated with leverage. 
None of these variables except sales growth remain robustly significant for explaining LBO 
leverage when we use them as controls in the regressions described in Subsection E below.  LBO 
Debt/EBITDA does seem to go up with sales growth, which is not what the trade-off theory would 
predict if sales growth proxies for growth opportunities that can be lost in financial distress.  We think 
it more likely that this relation occurs because sales growth is related to expected future growth in 
EBITDA, which can explain why the private equity sponsor is willing to take on relatively high debt 
levels compared to today’s EBITDA.   
D.  LBO leverage and debt market conditions. 
The variables used in Table 6 have been used in previous research to explain capital structure in public 
companies. Yet, they do not appear to explain capital structure in buyouts, at least not in the way a 
trade-off or pecking order theory would predict. We now go on to examine whether debt market 
conditions help explain leverage in buyouts better, as suggested by either the market timing or the GP-
LP agency stories outlined in Section III. 
The patterns previously shown in Figure 1 seem broadly consistent with debt market conditions 




pro-cyclical, while public company peer leverage is not. To examine this pattern in more detail, we 
continue our univariate approach of sorting the public companies on various measures – in this case on 
debt market conditions – and then considering leverage of both the buyouts and the matched public 
company industry-region-date medians.  
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  7.  Using  the  high-yield  spread  as  a  measure  of  market 
conditions for lower-quality loans of the sort used in buyouts, all three measures of leverage decrease 
for buyouts as the spread increases.  A lower spread is typically thought to be suggestive of better 
financial conditions and a hotter market for high-yield debt, so it is not surprising that buyout firms use 
more debt when this spread is lower.  Yet, the relation goes the opposite way for the public companies, 
for which each measure of leverage is increasing with the high-yield spread. In other words, leverage 
in public companies increases, if anything, when debt market conditions worsen.  
We confirm these patterns using two alternative measures of debt market conditions. First, we 
calculate the difference between the earnings yield in the S&P 500 index and the high-yield rate at the 
time of the buyout, which Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) document to be positively related to private 
equity fundraising.  Arguably, this measure captures the difference in relative pricing across public 
equity and debt markets, and a larger value of this variable indicates that equity is relatively “cheap” 
compared  to  high-yield  bonds.  Second,  we  use  a  measure  of  “credit  tightening”  according  to  a 
quarterly survey undertaken by the U.S. Federal Reserve. In particular, we use the net percentage of 
loan officers in medium and large U.S. banks reporting tightening standards for loans.
33 This measure 
captures non-price aspects of credit market conditions, such as debt covenants and quantity constraints. 
When we sort the LBO transactions across quartiles using these two debt market condition measures, 
we find a significantly positive relationship between leverage and the ease of debt market conditions 
for the LBOs, whereas the pattern for the public comparators usually goes in the opposite direction.  
Again, these patterns are strongly suggestive that the drivers of capital structures are different for 
LBOs and public companies.  
In addition to the quantity of debt, we also examine the composition of debt as a function of 
debt market conditions.  Table 8 considers the way in which the types of debt used in the sample of 
buyouts varies intertemporally and in relation to our measures of debt market conditions.  It is evident 
that the proportion of amortizing Term Loan A debt, which is the tranche of the loan that is provided 
by banks as opposed to other financial institutions, has both declined over time and is countercyclical, 
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with the fraction increasing after the internet bust of 2000-2001 and decreasing during the “credit 
bubble” in 2005-2007.  This pattern is clear and statistically significant when sorting on debt market 
conditions.  During very liquid credit markets, when buyout leverage is generally higher, banks hold a 
lower fraction of the buyout debt as opposed to hedge funds, collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) 
and other non-bank financial institutions. Table 8 also shows a similar pattern for the maturity of debt, 
measured as the proportion of total debt maturing in five years.  Using high-yield spreads as a measure 
of credit conditions, the maturity increases from 9% of debt being due in five years for the median 
buyout in the lowest spread quartile, to 29% in the highest spread quartile. These finding are consistent 
with the observations of Kaplan and Stein (1993) about the late-1980’s LBO boom.
34 In addition, 
during  hot  credit  market  conditions,  contingent  debt  commitments  increase,  while  the  fraction  of 
“alternative debt” (defined as vendor, sponsor, and off-balance-sheet financing) decreases.  It appears 
that when markets are hot, lenders are more willing to provide extra sources of finance such as lines of 
credit for capital expansion, while when times are tougher, buyout firms have to go to alternative 
sources such as vendor or self-provided debt for financing.   
To  summarize,  these  various  univariate  analyses  suggest  that  debt  market  conditions,  as 
opposed to firm-specific debt capacity, are the main determinants of buyout leverage. In the next 
section we investigate these relations in a multivariate regression framework. 
E.  Multivariate analysis of buyout capital structures 
The sorts reported in Tables 5-8 are suggestive that capital structures in LBOs are determined by debt 
market conditions rather than the theories of capital structure that have been developed and applied to 
publicly  traded  firms.    To  explore  this  issue  more  rigorously  we  present  multivariate  regressions 
modelling capital structure choices for both LBOs and public companies. Descriptive statistics for the 
regression variables are provided in Table 9. 
Table 10 considers the impact of debt market conditions on leverage. The first six columns 
present regressions predicting the leverage for our sample of matched public companies, and for the 
subset  that  adjusted  their  capital  structure.  These  first  equations  rely  on  a  fairly  parsimonious 
specification, including only the high-yield spread, plus regional dummies and industry fixed effects.  
We confirm the positive relationship found earlier between the credit spread and leverage for public 
companies; the results are particularly significant when leverage is measure by debt to enterprise value. 
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Similar  (unreported)  results  are  obtained  when  we  use  our  subsample  of  debt-issuing  public 
companies. 
In  Columns  7-12,  we  predict  comparable  leverage  levels  for  our  sample  of  buyouts.    In 
Columns  7-9  we  first  try  to  explain  each  measure  of  leverage  using  the  median  leverage  for  the 
matched public companies.  If the same explanations for leverage hold for both sets of companies, we 
would  expect  positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficients  on  the  public  industry  leverage 
variables.  However, the only statistically significant coefficient is actually negative, while the other 
two coefficients are positive, small and not statistically significant.   
However, in Columns 10-12, when we add the credit spread to the equation, it is negative and 
highly statistically significant in each specification.  Columns 13-18 replicate Columns 7-12, except 
that they add controls for deal location, deal type and deal size. The results in these columns are similar 
to those in Columns 7-12: leverage of public comparables does not explain buyout leverage but buyout 
leverage is strongly related to debt market conditions as measured by the yield spread.  Deal size, 
however,  is  indeed  another  important  determinant  of  LBO  leverage.  Larger  deals  (measured  by 
enterprise value quartiles) are significantly more highly levered than smaller deals for all our three 
leverage measures, and public-to-private deals seem more highly levered than other LBO types. 
Table  11  presents  leverage  regressions  controlling  for  company  characteristics.  For  public 
companies  (Columns  1-3),  more  profitable  industries  (as  measured  by  return  on  invested  capital, 
ROIC) have lower leverage, industries with more variable cash flows (as measured by the standard 
deviation of ROIC) have lower leverage, and industries with more growth opportunities (proxied by 
R&D-to-sales and market-to-book ratios) have lower leverage. These results are broadly consistent 
with the earlier capital structure literature for public companies.  In contrast, the regressions reported in 
columns 4-6 show that almost none of these company characteristics have any significant relationship 
with buyout leverage.  The only exception is that when we measure leverage as Debt/EBITDA, LBOs 
matched to industries with high sales growth and low corporate tax rate tend to have higher leverage, 
although the economic significance is small.  Note that this result is the opposite of what the trade-off 
theory would predict.  In contrast to industry characteristics, the high-yield spread variable is still a 
strong determinant of buyout capital structure.  It appears that the pattern is robust: public leverage is 
related to the factors from the trade-off and pecking order theories discussed in other work, while 




F.  Pricing of Deals 
To this point we have focused on the way in which capital structure differs between buyouts and public 
companies, and whether the determinants of leverage are similar in each group of companies. We now 
turn to the issue of the factors that affect buyout pricing.  Our measure of price is enterprise value 
divided by EBITDA, which we refer to as the “EV multiple”, which is the most commonly-used metric 
for price in the private equity sector.
35 Of particular interest, returning to the questions raised in the 
introduction, the evidence in Figure 1, and indeed the title of the paper, is whether conditions in the 
debt market not only affect capital structure but also the valuation of companies. 
Table 12 examines the relation between pricing in buyouts and in public companies. It presents 
estimates of equations predicting EV multiples as a function of company and market characteristics.  
The first two columns consider the extent to which pricing in buyouts and in public firms are related to 
the high-yield spread.  The spread has a negative and statistically significant impact on prices both of 
buyouts  and  public  firms.    Comparing  the  coefficients,  however,  the  negative  magnitude  is 
significantly  larger  for  the  LBO  multiple  than  the  public  company  multiple,  indicating  that  LBO 
pricing is more sensitive to debt market conditions.  
The fact that public company valuations are related to the credit spread suggests that the spread 
not only proxies for debt market conditions, but also picks up changes in the economy-wide discount 
rate or risk premium.  Hence, before we can conclude that debt market conditions drive LBO pricing, 
we need to control for changes in discount rates.  In the third column we do so by controlling for the 
matched public company EV multiple in the equation predicting pricing in buyouts.  Changes in the 
discount rate should be reflected in public company valuations. As expected (and in contrast to the 
leverage  regressions)  the  coefficient  on  the  median  public  company  multiple  is  positive  and 
statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the credit-spread variable is negative and statistically significant 
as before, and the magnitude of the coefficient is the same as in the previous columns. The effect of 
credit  market  conditions  on  LBO  pricing  appears  to  be  fairly  orthogonal  to  general  changes  in 
economy-wide discount rates.  The fourth column adds a number of deal-level controls and finds a 
similar effect; credit market conditions have a strong relation with buyout pricing.  Buyout pricing and 
buyout leverage both appear to be determined in large part by debt market conditions; the results are 
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consistent  with  easier  availability  of  leverage  driving  up  LBO  transaction  prices,  as  is  commonly 
suggested by practitioners and by the financial press. 
The final two columns try to get at this issue more directly by considering the relation directly 
between LBO EV multiples and LBO leverage.  The evidence from Figure 1 suggests that, at least in a 
time-series aggregate, leverage and pricing in buyouts are highly correlated.  This correlation does not 
necessarily imply that leverage has a causal impact on pricing, since both are likely to be functions of 
common, unobserved factors.  In addition there are likely to be measurement error issues when our 
proxies for pricing (enterprise value) and leverage (total debt) are both normalised by EBITDA.   
Still, we present some suggestive evidence on the relation between leverage and pricing by 
regressing price multiples on leverage, using high-yield spreads as an instrument for leverage in the 
first  stage  in  the  fifth  column.  Although  this  approach  addresses  the  measurement  problem  in 
EBITDA, one can question whether it controls adequately for endogeneity, since, as previously argued, 
spreads may be related to the cost of capital  (although we control for public market pricing in the 
regression).  As an alternative, we estimate this equation in the sixth column using the fraction of debt 
that is Term Loan A as an instrument for leverage, since this fraction is likely to be related to the 
amount of leverage available but not to the pricing of the deal (except through the leverage channel).  
Using  either  instrument,  our  estimates  indicate  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  relationship 
between instrumented leverage and pricing in buyouts.  This relation remains after controlling for 
pricing multiples prevailing in public markets. 
We believe that our results on LBO leverage and pricing are unlikely to be driven by matching 
or  measurement  error.    Apart  from  the  robustness  results  discussed  previously,  we  reestimate  the 
regression analysis of leverage and pricing in Table A2 of the appendix for the subsample of public-to-
private transactions, where we are able to control for pre-LBO firm characteristics rather than industry-
region-level proxies.  In these equations, we again find similar results to those in Table 12, with  
leverage strongly predicting the pricing of deals.   
To summarize the results so far, our results suggest that (a) debt market conditions, rather than 
firm-specific factors, are the primary driver of leverage in buyouts, and (b) debt market conditions also 
drive the prices paid in these transactions, presumably through the leverage channel.   
G. LBO transactions and Private Equity sponsor characteristics 
Our  results  suggest  that  both  buyout  leverage  and  pricing  are  strongly  related  to  debt  market 




choose leverage optimally to maximize the value of the LBO target firm, and the optimal leverage ratio 
is  higher  during  hot  credit  market  conditions.  This  explanation  appears  to  be  unlikely  given  our 
empirical results for several reasons: First, leverage in buyouts is essentially unrelated to comparable 
public company leverage and characteristics in the cross-section, even for subsamples of public firms 
that are more likely to adjust or increase leverage. Second, public firms across all subsamples decrease 
rather than increase their leverage in response to improving debt market conditions.  In an optimal 
leverage story, we would expect that (a) at least some proxies for benefits and costs of leverage should 
have the same cross-sectional relation for public companies and buyouts, and (b) that at least some 
public companies (such as the ones that actively manage their capital structures) should increase their 
leverage as well in response to improving debt market conditions.   
Consequently, it appears that the data are more consistent with the market timing or the GP-LP 
agency explanations discussed in Section III than with one based on portfolio company characteristics. 
To distinguish between the market timing and the agency stories, we first consider the manner 
in  which  LBO  leverage  and  pricing  are  related  to  private  equity  fund  characteristics.    If  buyout 
leverage is principally used to arbitrage debt and equity markets, then the more reputable firms, who 
have better access to debt markets, should be able to take advantage of these opportunities to a greater 
extent  than  less  reputable  firms.  Other  research,  such  as  Demiroglu  and  James  (forthcoming)  and 
Ivashina and Kovner (2008) present evidence suggesting that more reputable private equity funds have 
easier and cheaper access to debt.  
We evaluate this argument using three different measures of private equity fund reputation: the 
amount of capital raised by the sponsor, the number of past private equity funds raised by the sponsor, 
and the number of private equity transactions undertaken during the last three years.  For every buyout 
deal, we calculate the relative ranking of the sponsor according to these three measures at the time of 
the  deal,  normalized  between  zero  and  one,  in  order  to  get  a  time-invariant  measure  (since  LBO 
volume  has  increased  over  time).
36  Since  the  relation  between  these  rankings  and  our  dependent 
variables is unlikely to be linear, we use dummy variables for whether the sponsor was relatively 
highly ranked according to these measures.
37 We are able to find this information about the private 
equity firms, and their different funds, for about three-quarters of our overall sample of transactions. 
We also include controls for the deal size relative to the overall fund size, and whether the private 
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equity firm is affiliated to a commercial or investment bank (which arguably could increase access to 
leverage). 
Table 13 presents regressions of our various leverage measures for each LBO transaction on 
private  equity  firm-  and  fund-level  characteristics,  in  addition  to  the  debt  market  and  public 
comparator  variables  discussed  previously.  Overall,  the  statistical  significance  of  the  reputation 
variables is weak and fairly inconsistent.  While the number of past funds raised seems positively 
related to D/EBITDA and EV/EBITDA, other reputation variables are statistically insignificant and 
often enter with a negative sign.  In addition, economic significance of these reputation variables is 
quite low (especially compared to the high-yield spread).
38 There is some weak evidence that deals that 
are large relative to the size of the fund (measured by EV/fund size) use more debt.  Although there 
could be several explanations for this finding, it is broadly consistent with the agency story of Axelson 
et  al.  (2009),  in  which  leverage  can  lead  to  overinvestment.
39    Also,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the 
coefficient on our measure of debt market conditions, the high-yield spread, is consistently negative 
and statistically significant in all leverage and pricing regressions. 
The ultimate test of whether the willingness of private equity firms to take on leverage is good 
or bad for investors, however, is the question of whether deal leverage affects fund returns.  Return 
data (measured as fund-level IRR) is available from Preqin for 185 private equity funds in our sample, 
which invested in 595 of our LBO deals. This means that we are able to match about one-half of our 
total sample of transactions to funds where we can observe their returns. Of course, our transactions 
are a relatively small subset of the total number of buyouts conducted by these funds, but for the 
remaining buyouts data was not available. Nonetheless, we have a reasonably large sample of fund 
returns, and, on average, detailed information on around three buyouts per fund. 
Table 14 presents regressions of private equity fund-level IRRs on LBO deal-level leverage and 
a  number  of  variables  designed  to  control  for  other  factors  affecting  returns,  such  as  market 
fluctuations and risk factors.  In our regressions we control for fund vintage year (i.e., the year the fund 
was raised), region and industry fixed effects, LBO type dummies, fund benchmark returns, and, in 
some specifications, LBO year.  Taken together, these controls should absorb a major part of the effect 
of  market  return  fluctuations  and  differences  in  risk  premia  across  deals.    Since  we  have  several 
observations for any given fund, we cluster our standard errors both at the fund and vintage year levels.  
                                                 
38 One concern is that these reputation variables are correlated with each other, introducing multicollinearity problems in 
the regressions.  In unreported regressions we enter the fund characteristics one at a time with very similar results.  
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Finally, since previous research (notably Kaplan and Schoar (2005)) has found significant persistence 
in  the  performance  across  funds  for  a  given  private  equity  sponsor,  we  also  control  for  the 
partnership’s previous fund’s IRR, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether this is a sponsor’s 
first fund. 
The  first  column  estimates  how  a  fund’s  IRR  relates  to  private  equity  firm  and  fund 
characteristics. Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) persistence result holds for our sample as well, and this 
finding is robust to all alternative specifications that we have estimated. None of the other private 
equity firm/fund characteristics are statistically significant. In the remaining columns we introduce 
deal-level leverage and deal size variables. Overall, the results provide strong support for the agency 
story  as  opposed  to  the  arbitrage  story  for  leverage.    In  particular,  deal-level  leverage  is  always 
negatively  related  to  fund  returns,  and  statistically  significantly  so  for  our  log  D/EBITDA  and 
I/EBITDA measures (see Columns 2-4).  Hence, funds doing transactions with more leverage tend to 
underperform other funds, controlling for other factors affecting returns.   
Of course the Modigliani-Miller theorem predicts that leverage should have a strong effect on 
returns. This effect, however, works in the opposite direction of what we find in the data. Modigliani-
Miller logic implies that leverage should increase average (expected) equity returns, while the results 
presented in Table 14 suggest that the opposite is true in our sample and that funds with more levered 
deals have lower returns. 
In Column 5 of Table 14 we consider whether there is any evidence that funds make money by 
timing debt markets, by splitting leverage into the component explained by variation in debt markets 
and residual leverage. We do this by first estimating a regression of log D/EBITDA on high-yield 
spreads and using the fitted values from this regression to calculate predicted leverage.  We then 
calculate “residual” leverage as the difference between actual and predicted log D/EBITDA.  If funds  
arbitrage debt markets against equity markets when debt is “cheap”, we would expect the predicted 
component  of  leverage  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  fund  returns.    However,  we  find  that  both 
components of leverage have a negative impact on returns, which is inconsistent with a market-timing 
story.  In Column 6 we investigate whether the negative effect of leverage is driven by the relatively 
more levered deals by separating log D/EBITDA depending on whether this variable is below or above 
the sample median.  As the table shows, the negative effect is driven by the deals with a D/EBITDA 
above the sample median, while the coefficient is smaller and insignificant when D/EBITDA is below 
the  sample  median.    This  suggests  that  low  to  moderate  leverage  levels  do  not  significantly  hurt 




overinvestment / risk shifting hurts investors, the results in Column 7 show that deals that are large 
relative to fund size are associated with negative fund returns. Finally, these results are not driven by 
the timing of transactions, even though (as Figure 1 shows) valuation multiples vary considerably over 
time. When, in column 7, transaction year fixed effects are included, the results are unaffected. 
To summarize these results, the evidence that fund-level returns tend to be negatively related to 
the transaction-level leverage suggests that private equity sponsors may be acting more in their own 
(carried!) interest than their investors’ when they impose highly leveraged capital structures on their 
portfolio companies.  Note that this does not necessarily imply that a highly levered capital structure 
imposes extra costs on the portfolio firm itself, as some critics of LBOs have argued.  Instead, our data 
indicates that the prices private equity funds seem to be willing to pay for highly levered deals are not 
only high, but excessive.  
VI.  Conclusions 
 
Private equity firms have become increasingly important as a source of capital and governance for 
companies. The majority of capital raised by private equity funds is used for leveraged buyouts, in 
which equity from limited partners is supplemented with additional deal-level debt financing. Each of 
these  buyouts  thus  represents  a  capital  structure  decision;  the  total  capital  involved  in  these  is 
enormous.  Buyout financing represents an important yet largely unexplored issue, for which there are 
implications both for the study of private equity, and also for corporate finance more broadly. Are the 
theories that have been developed to explain capital structures of public firms applicable to buyout 
firms, or do completely different factors explain buyout capital structures than explain capital structure 
in public firms?  What is the role of debt market conditions and do they explain the extreme cyclicality 
of the buyout industry?  How does the availability and pricing of debt contribute to the quantity pricing 
and returns of buyouts observed in the economy? 
To  address  these  and  related  questions,  this  paper  constructs a   large,  detailed,  and 
geographically diverse sample of buyouts - to our knowledge the most complete such database yet 
assembled. Previous analyses have tended to focus on U.S. public-to-private transactions, which are a 
small subset of all private equity deals. Our sample of 1157 transactions includes the often-studied 
public-to-private deals, but the vast majority of the transactions are the more common deals involving 
the purchase of private companies, and divisions of public companies.  Our sample also differs from 
most in that it includes a substantial number of non-U.S. deals. We combine detailed information on 




information on private equity firm and fund characteristics to produce the first comprehensive analysis 
of the capital structure of buyouts.  
We first characterize how buyouts are financed, and find that, to a first order, buyout capital 
structures  appear  to  be  “inverted”  relative  to  comparable  public  companies.  On  average,  debt 
comprises around 70 percent of enterprise value in buyouts, which is about the proportion of equity in 
public companies. This debt comes in many different forms; we document the use of each type and the 
extent to which this use varies over differing market conditions. Much of the debt employed in buyouts 
is  non-amortizing,  and  it  is  common  that  for  some  tranches  even  interest  payments  are  optional. 
Contingent credit facilities are widely used and provide additional financial flexibility that is critical 
for firms operating with such high leverage.  
We next compare the capital structure of buyouts with a matched sample of public companies. 
Not surprisingly, leveraged buyouts employ more debt than do public companies, although the size of 
the difference is striking, and is strongly cyclical.  More surprising is our finding that there is no cross-
sectional relation whatsoever between the financial structure of buyouts and matched public firms. 
This finding is robust to a large number of alternative measures of leverage and control samples.  
The  lack  of  a  relation  between  buyout  financial  structures  and  public  company  financial 
structures suggests that different factors determine capital structure decisions of public companies and 
private equity firms. We econometrically investigate the extent to which various possible factors affect 
capital structures of buyout and public companies. Variables suggested by previous research work 
well, and in accordance with theory, for the public companies. However, the factors that predict capital 
structure in public companies have no explanatory power for buyouts. Instead, the main factors that do 
affect the capital structure of buyouts are the price and availability of debt; when credit is abundant and 
cheap, buyouts become more leveraged. In contrast, no such effect is observed in the matched public 
companies. Our sample is particularly useful in this respect, since we include transactions from the 
1980s through to the recent credit bubble, and even some transactions completed after the ensuing 
financial  crisis.  As  a  consequence  we  observe  considerable  time-series  variation  in  debt  market 
conditions. 
Our results suggest that capital structure in buyouts requires a different explanation than in 
public firms.  Private equity practitioners often state that they use as much leverage as they can to 
maximize the expected returns on each deal. The main constraint they face, of course, is the capital 
market, which limits at any particular time how much private equity sponsors can borrow for any 




higher  leverage  chosen  by  private  equity  funds  during  hot  markets  could  plausibly  not  be  in  the 
interests of their investors.   
An important issue is whether company valuations are related to leverage, since if private 
equity funds pay more for portfolio companies when higher leverage is available, then the higher 
leverage could drive pricing beyond what is in the interests of investors. We document a significant 
relation between leverage and valuation, which is consistent with the view that the prices that private 
equity funds are willing to pay increases with the leverage they employ. However, there are a number 
of alternative explanations for this finding. In particular, when credit conditions are favorable and 
interest rates and the cost of capital are low, and valuations and leverage could be high for simple 
discounting reasons.  Distinguishing between these effects is difficult without a large panel of deal-
level outcomes.  
In the absence of these data, we perform two sets of tests. We first try to isolate the impact of 
leverage on pricing by controlling for general movements in valuation multiples in public companies, 
which will also be affected by economy-wide movements in interest rates. Even controlling for such 
movements, as well as a number of fund-level characteristics that potentially influence the bidding 
behavior  of  private  equity  firms,  credit  conditions  appear  to  impact  LBO  pricing  positively.  The 
second set of tests utilizes fund-level returns data, to which we can match a significant subset of our 
buyouts. Although this data is one step removed from the deal level returns that we would ideally 
prefer, provided our sample of deals is representative of those undertaken by each fund, it nonetheless 
allows us to analyze whether highly leveraged deals are associated with higher or lower returns for 
investors. The regressions suggest that there are consistently negative relations between fund returns 
and our various leverage measures. We also confirm previous findings regarding the persistence of 
performance by private equity firms across successive funds.  
Capital structures in public companies and private equity portfolio firms appear to be driven by 
different factors. Costs from the incentive contracts that are ubiquitous in private equity are important 
determinants of LBO capital structures.  Given the increasing role of private equity in the economy and 
the  importance  of  financial  markets  in  these  deals,  understanding  the  mechanism  through  which 
financial  conditions  affect  private  equity  transactions  more  completely  seems  like  an  increasingly 
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Figure 1: Market trends in leverage and pricing 
 
The figure shows median values of Net Deb t to Enterprise Value times 10, Net Deb t to EBITDA, and  Enterprise 
Value to EBITDA for a sample of 1157 leverage buyout transactions (Panel A) and the corresponding median values 
for matched public companies.  Each leveraged buyout is matched to the median value for public firms in the same 
Fama-French 49 industry, month, and region (U.S., Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia). See Table 5 
for definitions of all variables. There are no buyouts in the year 1991.  
 
Panel A: Leveraged buyouts 
 





Figure 2: LBO Versus Public Market Leverage 
 
This figure shows LBO leverage for the sample plotted against the median public company leverage in the same 
Fama-French 49 industry, year and month, and region (U.S., Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia) as 
the LBO. The sample excludes LBOs in the banking and insurance industries (Fama-French industries 45 and 46). In 
addition, panels B and C exclu de two LBOs with negative EBITDA at t he time of the transaction and the industry 
median calculation excludes firms with negative EBITDA.   Leverage is measured as net debt to enterprise value 
(market value of equity plus debt minus cash and short-term investments) in Panel A; net debt (i.e. debt minus cash 
and short-term investments) to EBITDA value in Panel B, and net interest expense over EBITDA in panel C, and 
excludes outliers where LBO I/EBITDA>8. Panel C excludes interest payments on vendor and sponsor loans. For the 
public companies, the net debt to EV is calculated using equity market value in the month preceding the date of the 
closing of the syndicated loan for the corresponding LBO.  For the LBOs, the net debt does not include contingent 
debt such as lines of credit. For the t-statistics, standard errors are clustered by year. 
 
Panel A: Debt / Enterprise Value 
 
D/EV:  Slope = 0.056, T-statistic = 1.71, R-squared=0.004, N=971 
 
Panel B: Debt / EBITDA 
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Panel C: Net Interest / EBITDA 
 






Table 1: A Typical Private Equity Buyout: the August 2005 Purchase of Kwik-Fit 
Kwik-Fit is a leading tyre and exhaust fitting company, operating in the UK, Netherlands, France and Germany. 
Private  equity  funds  were  both  the  buyer  and  the  seller:  PAI  bought  KwiK-Fit  from  CVC.  In  private  equity 
transactions the purchase price and level of debt are typically expressed in terms of multiples of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), as shown in the last column. In this example, the estimated 
EBITDA for 2005 of £95.9m is the reference point. Pricing of the debt is expressed relative to the London Inter-bank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). For the mezzanine debt, the return is split between cash interest payments and “payments in 
kind” (PIK).  
 
  Amount 
(£m) 





Enterprise Value  773.5      8.1 x 
         
Equity  191.0 
(25%)      2.0 x 
         
Debt         
  Term Loan A  140  7 year amortizing  2.25%   
  Term Loan B  135  8 year bullet  2.50%   
  Term Loan C  135  9 year bullet  3.00%   
  Total Senior Debt  410.0      4.3 x 
  2
nd Lien  75  9.5 year  5.00%   
  Mezzanine  97.5  10 year  4.5% + 5% PIK   
Total Debt  582.5 
(75%)      6.1 x 
         
Revolving credit facility  40  7 year  2.25%   
Capex facility  50  7 year  2.25%   







Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
 
This table shows the distribution of our sample companies according to various characteristics. In Panel A, LBOs are classified according to whether the transaction 
involved the buyout of a division of a larger company, whether the target was an independent private firm or was quoted on a stock exchange (public-to-private), 
whether it was a secondary transaction where the vendor was a private equity sponsor, or whether the acquisition was connected to a privatization or bankruptcy. 
Additional information on the distribution of our sample by country, industry and private equity sponsor is provided in the Appendix. In terms of geography, the 
companies are classified according to whether their head office is located in the US, Europe or Rest of the World. Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the size of 
the LBOs in our sample, according to enterprise value (EV), and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The numbers of observations 
differ since data is not available for all measures for all companies. All values are in constant 2008 USD. Probability-values for rejecting the equality among groups 
using a Kruskal-Wallis test are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of the sample by status prior to the LBO and region 














Year as % 
of total 
1980  0  0  0  1  0    1  0  0  1  0.1% 
1981  0  0  0  3  0    3  0  0  3  0.3% 
1982  0  0  0  5  0    5  0  0  5  0.4% 
1983  0  0  0  6  0    6  0  0  6  0.5% 
1984  0  0  0  14  0    14  0  0  14  1.2% 
1985  0  0  0  10  0    10  0  0  10  0.9% 
1986  1  0  0  9  0    10  0  0  10  0.9% 
1987  1  0  0  13  0    14  0  0  14  1.2% 
1988  1  1  0  23  0    25  0  0  25  2.2% 
1989  0  1  0  9  0    10  0  0  10  0.9% 
1990  0  0  0  1  0    1  0  0  1  0.1% 
1991  0  0  0  0  0    0  0  0  0  0.0% 
1992  1  0  0  2  0    3  0  0  3  0.3% 
1993  1  0  0  2  0    3  0  0  3  0.3% 
1994  4  6  0  1  0    11  0  0  11  1.0% 
1995  6  4  0  2  0    12  0  0  12  1.0% 
1996  7  2  0  3  3    15  0  0  15  1.3% 
1997  4  12  0  16  4    32  4  0  36  3.1% 
1998  6  8  0  18  4    32  4  0  36  3.1% 
1999  17  8  0  32  9    49  17  0  66  5.7% 
2000  26  12  0  21  8    41  25  1  67  5.8% 
2001  25  5  1  16  3    25  25  0  50  4.3% 
2002  42  11  0  10  10    28  45  0  73  6.3% 
2003  38  14  3  18  27    49  50  1  100  8.6% 
2004  42  22  1  17  55    73  64  0  137  11.8% 
2005  38  23  0  25  62    69  79  0  148  12.8% 
2006  31  20  1  38  50    70  68  2  140  12.1% 
2007  27  15  3  42  54    73  64  4  141  12.2% 
2008  2  3  0  11  4    10  8  2  20  1.7% 
Total  320  167  9  368  293    694  453  10  1,157   







Panel B: Size of the LBOs in the sample 
  Enterprise Value, million USD    EBITDA, million USD 
  N  Mean  Median  Min  Max    N  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Total sample  1033  1,602.8  683.2  18.9  59,509.5    1157  174.9  81.9  -16.2  6391.3 
                       
By type of LBO:                       
Divisional  295  1,289.9  701.8  18.9  16,844.2    316  169.1  98.2  -16.2  2864.9 
Private company  117  602.8  432.1  56.1  2,769.8    164  70.1  52.1  1.6  380.2 
Privatization/Bankruptcy  6  1,383.4  1802.3  174.6  2,182.5    9  149.7  162.6  17.1  343.8 
Public-to-private  375  2,566.9  848.2  43.5  59,509.5    378  275.9  104.4  -0.1  6391.3 
Secondary  240  974.2  599.0  57.2  17,835.0    290  109.6  67.7  4.1  1598.1 
                       
KW test for difference between types   p-value  0.000
***            0.000
***       
                       
By time period:                       
1980-84  29  922.2  803.8  173.0  3,658.3    29  124.7  113.0  27.0  311.1 
1985-89  78  3,895.9  935.6  43.5  59,509.5    79  442.4  101.8  -0.1  6391.3 
1990-94  17  646.4  467.0  88.5  2,948.4    18  101.8  52.4  8.9  730.4 
1995-99  158  774.5  589.0  72.0  3,745.9    163  91.9  69.9  -16.2  390.2 
2000-04  387  886.7  519.1  18.9  8,533.9    422  123.1  72.4  4.5  1259.4 
2005-08  364  2,331.3  922.9  56.1  50,037.7    446  213.1  89.1  1.6  5205.7 
                       
KW test for difference between periods   p-value  0.000
***            0.000
***       
                       
By Region:                       
North America  640  1,796.2  652.5  40.7  59,509.5    703  189.1  74.4  -16.2  6391.3 
Western Europe  387  1,282.2  720.7  57.2  25,154.1    444  153.5  90.9  10.3  2160.7 
Rest of World  6  1,659.5  1876.7  18.9  2,625.3    10  127.6  118.6  5.6  293.3 
                       
KW test for difference between regions   p-value  0.284            0.035
**       






Table 3:  The structure of LBO Debt 
 
This table shows the structure of debt employed in LBOs. The reported figures, with the exception of the first column, 
represent mean values across our sample of buyouts. The main categorization is between senior secured bank debt, and 
subordinated debt. Senior debt is often split into separate tranches, with differing seniority, amortization, and interest rates 
(and sometimes currencies). Term Loan A is amortizing debt, while Term loans B, C, and higher (Term loan B,C,…) are 
typically non-amortizing. Subordinated debt can take a variety of forms including mezzanine and 2
nd lien debt. Similarly, 
bonds can either be senior or high-yield junior bonds, which are more common given the highly leveraged structure of most 
LBOs. A variety of other debt is observed in our sample. Vendor loans refer to transactions where the vendor is prepared to 
accept some part of the total price as a loan note secured on the target company. In most LBOs the existing debt is paid off 
as part of the transactions, but in a minority of cases the new owners take on some of the existing debt. We refer to this as 
assumed debt. In a few cases we also observe loans from the private equity sponsor (Sponsor loans), and some explicit off-
balance sheet financing; we categorize all these separately. Contingent debt refers to facilities that are put in place at the 
time of the LBO to fund working capital, capex, acquisitions etc., but are not drawn down at the time of the transaction. 
Some  transactions  involve  preferred  equity,  which  can  be  similar  to  low-seniority  debt,  although  we  neither  include 
preferred equity nor contingent debt in our calculations of leverage in subsequent tables. 
 
  Exists  
(% of LBOs) 
% of total debt 
(excluding 
contingent debt) 
  Basis 
points over 
LIBOR 
Paydown within 5 years 
Senior bank debt           
 Term loan A  62.2%  23.4%    276  68.0% 
 Term loan B,C, …  89.3%  46.2%    306  5.5% 
 Bridge loans  9.4%  2.9%    271  71.1% 
Subordinated debt           
 2
nd lien  10.6%  2.5%    543  5.3% 
 Mezzanine  41.0%  9.9%    519  1.3% 
Bonds           
 Senior  7.1%  2.3%    485  4.7% 
 Junior  21.9%  9.3%    561  0.5% 
Other debt           
 Vendor loans  2.9%  0.5%    648  - 
Assumed debt  2.6%  1.0%    -  - 
 Sponsor loans  1.0%  0.3%    761  - 
 Off balance sheet  1.8%  0.6%    -  - 
Total debt    100%    490  22.8% 
Contingent debt           
 Revolver  92.1%  14.2%       
 Other facilities  25.2%  3.7%       
           
 Preferred equity  2.6%  0.5%    627  - 





Table 4:  Leverage and deal pricing 
 
This table shows the amount of debt used and the transaction valuation paid in the acquisition in the sample of LBOs. Debt includes senior secured bank debt and all 
forms of subordinated debt (see Table 3 for details). Interest includes all the projected interest payments in the first year after the transaction. Measures are (1) debt 
divided by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (D/EBITDA), (2) debt divided by enterprise value (D/EV), (3) total interest divided by 
EBITDA (I/EBITDA), and (4) enterprise value divided by EBITDA (EV/EBITDA). Probability-values for rejecting equality among groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test 
are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  D / EBITDA  D / EV  I / EBITDA  EV / EBITDA 
  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
All LBO transactions  1142  5.6  5.2  1002  0.69  0.70  873  0.50  0.45  1009  8.2  7.6 
                         
Divisional  315  5.0  4.7  289  0.69  0.70  238  0.43  0.39  290  7.4  6.8 
Private company  163  4.9  4.7  115  0.64  0.65  139  0.44  0.42  114  7.8  7.4 
Public-to-private  366  6.5  5.8  354  0.73  0.73  253  0.62  0.57  362  8.8  8.0 
Secondary  289  5.6  5.3  238  0.66  0.68  237  0.50  0.43  237  8.5  7.9 
Privatization/Bankruptcy  9  4.0  3.7  6  0.51  0.60  6  0.43  0.42  6  8.8  8.6 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value    0.000***      0.000***      0.000***      0.000***   
1980-84  29  6.3  5.5  29  0.84  0.87  0      29  7.15  6.33 
1985-89  68  8.0  7.8  64  0.89  0.91  41  0.98  0.93  67  8.55  8.24 
1990-94  18  6.5  6.1  17  0.80  0.81  16  0.62  0.59  17  7.67  7.68 
1995-99  161  5.5  5.1  158  0.68  0.69  148  0.64  0.55  154  8.44  7.53 
2000-04  421  4.4  4.3  379  0.65  0.67  325  0.35  0.33  382  6.91  6.63 
2005-08  445  6.3  5.8  355  0.68  0.69  343  0.53  0.5  360  9.54  8.81 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value    0.000***      0.000***      0.000***      0.000***   
North America  689  5.8  5.3  619  0.70  0.70  587  0.55  0.49  625  8.46  7.68 
Western Europe  443  5.3  4.9  377  0.68  0.68  283  0.42  0.38  378  7.79  7.38 
Rest of World  10  5.7  5.5  6  0.70  0.68  3  0.53  0.59  6  8.48  8.9 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value    0.000***      0.056*      0.000***      0.002***   
EV quartile 1 (smallest)  250  4.6  4.3  246  0.66  0.66  185  0.45  0.37  249  6.92  6.62 
EV quartile 2  252  5.2  5.0  251  0.68  0.69  200  0.47  0.43  252  7.68  7.29 
EV quartile 3  253  6.1  5.5  252  0.70  0.70  195  0.54  0.47  254  8.7  7.72 
EV quartile 4 (largest)  255  6.9  6.4  253  0.72  0.72  195  0.6  0.55  254  9.51  9.06 





Table 5:  Leverage of LBOs versus Public Companies 
 
This table shows the median values of Net Debt (i.e. debt net of cash) to Enterprise Value (D/EV), Net Debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (D/EBITDA), and Net interest expense to EBITDA (I/EBITDA) for the sample of 1157 LBO transactions and matched public companies split into 
subgroups according to the quartiles of the corresponding debt measure for matched publicly traded companies. In Panel A, each LBO is matched to the public 
companies in the same Fama-French 49 industry, year and month, and region (U.S., Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia). In Panel B, the predicted 
leverage of the LBO 5 years after the transaction, based on amortization schedules, is matched to the public companies in the same Fama-French 49 industry, year and 
month, and region. In Panel C, each LBO is matched to the public companies in the same industry, date, and region whose long-term debt to capital ratio (debt divided 
by debt plus book equity) changed by more than 10 percentage points in absolute value in the year of the LBO (“capital structure adjusters”). In Panel D, each LBO is 
matched to the public companies in the same industry, date, and region whose long-term debt increased by more than 10 percentage points of this year’s total book 
assets in the year of the LBO (“debt issuers”). Panel E focuses on a subsample of public-to-private LBOs where leverage can be observed prior to the buyout. 
Probability-values for rejecting the equality among groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
Panel A: LBO versus public company median leverage 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
Whole sample  0.70  0.35    5.1  3.8    0.45  0.12 
Leverage                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.69  0.19    5.4  2.7    0.43  0.07 
Public quartile 2  0.69  0.31    5.3  3.5    0.42  0.10 
Public quartile 3  0.71  0.40    5.2  4.2    0.42  0.13 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.70  0.54    4.8  5.2    0.53  0.20 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.08*  -    0.00***  -    0.00***  - 
 
Panel B: Predicted LBO leverage in 5 years versus public company median leverage 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  Pred. LBO 
leverage in 5 yrs 
 
Matched public 
  Pred. LBO 
leverage in 5 yrs 
 
Matched public 
  Pred. LBO 
leverage in 5 yrs 
 
Matched public 
Whole sample  0.55  0.35    4.2  3.8    0.35  0.12 
Leverage                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.58  0.19    4.4  2.7    0.33  0.07 
Public quartile 2  0.54  0.31    4.4  3.5    0.34  0.10 
Public quartile 3  0.55  0.40    4.3  4.2    0.32  0.13 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.53  0.54    3.7  5.2    0.41  0.20 





Panel C: LBO versus public company capital structure adjusters’ median leverage 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
Whole sample  0.70  0.33    5.1  4.2    0.45  0.15 
Leverage                 
Adjuster quartile 1 (lowest)  0.69  0.16    5.3  2.6    0.44  0.09 
Adjuster quartile 2  0.70  0.28    5.3  3.7    0.45  0.13 
Adjuster quartile 3  0.70  0.39    5.4  4.6    0.44  0.18 
Adjuster quartile 4 (highest)  0.70  0.55    4.7  6.2    0.46  0.29 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.71  -    0.02**  -    0.77  - 
 
Panel D: LBO versus public company debt issuers’ median leverage 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
Whole sample  0.70  0.33    5.1  4.7    0.45  0.13 
Leverage                 
Debt issuer quartile 1 (lowest)  0.68  0.17    5.3  3.4    0.38  0.08 
Debt issuer quartile 2  0.70  0.29    5.1  4.4    0.43  0.11 
Debt issuer quartile 3  0.70  0.37    5.2  5.2    0.45  0.16 
Debt issuer quartile 4 (highest)  0.71  0.51    5.0  6.5    0.55  0.24 














Panel E: Pre-LBO leverage  
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Pre-LBO    LBO  Pre-LBO    LBO  Pre-LBO 
Whole sample  0.70  0.38    5.6  3.2    0.54  0.11 
Leverage                 
Pre-LBO quartile 1 (lowest)  0.63  0.11    6.1  0.4    0.48  0.01 
Pre-LBO quartile 2  0.69  0.28    5.4  2.6    0.53  0.07 
Pre-LBO quartile 3  0.77  0.52    5.4  3.8    0.51  0.18 
Pre-LBO quartile 4 (highest)  0.75  0.97    6.0  5.9    0.61  0.33 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.02***  -    0.18  -    0.08*  - 
Observations  115      160      159   
                 
  Pre-LBO  Matched public    Pre-LBO  Matched Public    Pre-LBO  Matched Public 
Whole sample  0.38  0.29    3.2  3.5    0.11  0.11 
Leverage                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.28  0.11    2.1  2.3    0.06  0.06 
Public quartile 2   0.39  0.27    3.0  3.1    0.08  0.09 
Public quartile 3  0.46  0.37    3.4  3.8    0.10  0.13 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.45  0.49    3.8  4.9    0.19  0.21 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.03**  -    0.003***  -    0.00***  - 







Table 6:  Leverage of LBOs versus Public Companies 
 
This table shows the median values of Net Debt (i.e. net of cash) to Enterprise Value (D/EV), Net Debt to EBITDA (D / EBITDA), and Net interest expense to 
EBITDA for a sample of 1157 LBO transactions and matched public companies split into subgroups according to quartiles of the corresponding financial characteristic 
for matched public companies.  Each LBO is matched to the public companies in the same Fama-French 49 industry, year and month, and region (U.S., Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia). The definitions of the public company characteristics are: Market-to-book = [market value of equity + book value of long-
term debt] / [book value of equiy + book value of long-term debt]; Return on Invested Capital = EBITDA / [book value of equity + book value of long-term debt]; 
Volatility in ROIC = the standard deviation of return on invested capital over the last five years; Sales-to-PPE = Sales / Property, plant and equipment; tax rate is the 
statutory corporate  tax rate for the corresponding country and year. Probability-values for rejecting the equality among groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test are 
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
Market-to-book                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.69  0.52    4.5  4.4    0.36  0.13 
Public quartile 2  0.71  0.41    5.2  4.2    0.46  0.14 
Public quartile 3  0.70  0.31    5.4  3.5    0.46  0.11 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.69  0.21    5.6  3.1    0.52  0.09 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.39  0.00***    0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00*** 
R&D-to-sales                 
Zero  0.69  0.37    5.1  4.0    0.44  0.12 
Positive   0.71  0.28    5.1  3.2    0.49  0.10 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.31  0.00***    0.59  0.00***    0.06*  0.00*** 
Sales growth                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.69  0.41    4.7  4.0    0.37  0.12 
Public quartile 2  0.70  0.36    5.2  3.8    0.46  0.12 
Public quartile 3  0.69  0.32    5.3  3.7    0.46  0.11 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.70  0.33    5.5  3.6    0.49  0.11 








Table 6:  Leverage of LBOs versus Public Companies (continued) 
 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
ROIC                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.68  0.34    5.0  3.7    0.44  0.10 
Public quartile 2  0.69  0.33    5.3  4.3    0.44  0.12 
Public quartile 3  0.72  0.39    5.1  4.0    0.44  0.13 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.70  0.34    5.4  3.4    0.47  0.12 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.00***  0.00***    0.10*  0.00***    0.66  0.00*** 
Volatility in ROIC                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.70  0.46    5.0  4.5    0.39  0.13 
Public quartile 2  0.70  0.39    5.0  4.1    0.45  0.14 
Public quartile 3  0.72  0.34    5.3  3.6    0.48  0.12 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.68  0.21    5.4  3.0    0.46  0.08 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.04*  0.00***    0.05*  0.00***    0.01**  0.00*** 
Sales-to-PPE                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.71  0.38    4.8  4.2    0.42  0.16 
Public quartile 2  0.69  0.39    5.0  3.8    0.44  0.12 
Public quartile 3  0.70  0.29    5.4  3.6    0.51  0.10 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.68  0.35    5.3  3.7    0.45  0.09 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.12  0.00***    0.02**  0.00***    0.01***  0.00*** 
Tax rate                 
Low  0.70  0.39    5.3  4.2    0.43  0.11 
Medium  0.68  0.32    5.0  3.5    0.47  0.12 
High  0.83  0.44    5.4  3.4    0.36  0.16 








Table 7: Leverage of LBOs and debt market conditions 
 
This table shows median values of Net Debt (i.e. net of cash) to Enterprise Value (D/EV), Net Debt to EBITDA (D / EBITDA), and Net interest expense to EBITDA 
(I/EBITDA) for a sample of 1157 LBO transactions and matched public companies.  Each LBO is matched to the public companies in the same Fama-French 49 
industry, year and month, and region (U.S., Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia), and values for “matched public” is the median value among the 
public companies in this industry-year-region group. “U.S. high-yield spread” is the U.S high-yield rate minus U.S. Libor. “S&P E/P minus High-Yield-rate” is the 
S&P earnings divided by price minus the U.S high-yield rate. “Credit Tightening” is the net percentage of loan officers in medium and large banks reporting tightening 
standards for loans. All variables are measured at the end of the month of the LBO, except for credit tightening which is measured for the quarter of the buyout. 
Probability-values for rejecting the equality among groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  D/EV    D/EBITDA    I/EBITDA 
  LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public    LBO  Matched public 
US high-yield spread                 
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.70  0.29    6.1  3.7    0.56  0.11 
Public quartile 2  0.70  0.33    5.6  3.8    0.49  0.11 
Public quartile 3  0.70  0.37    4.8  3.8    0.39  0.12 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.66  0.44    4.2  4.2    0.31  0.13 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00*** 
S&P E/P minus High-Yield-rate               
Public quartile 1 (lowest)  0.66  0.45    4.3  4.2    0.40  0.15 
Public quartile 2  0.73  0.36    5.6  3.6    0.56  0.13 
Public quartile 3  0.69  0.32    5.0  3.8    0.38  0.10 
Public quartile 4 (highest)  0.70  0.30    5.9  3.8    0.50  0.10 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value  0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00*** 
Credit Tightening                 
Quartile 1 (easy)  0.70  0.33    5.0  3.8    0.36  0.10 
Quartile 2  0.70  0.30    5.4  3.6    0.47  0.10 
Quartile 3  0.69  0.33    5.4  3.8    0.53  0.11 
Quartile 4 (tight)  0.65  0.42    4.4  4.2    0.37  0.13 




Table 8: Debt structure and debt market conditions 
 
This table shows the mean and median values of various debt structure characteristics for a sample of 1157 LBO transactions. See Tables 3 and 4 for debt structure and 
leverage definitions and Table 7 for definitions of the credit conditions variables. “Contingent debt except revolver” refers to facilities that are put in place at the time 
of the LBO to fund capex, acquisitions, etc. which are not drawn down at the time of the transaction, excluding regular lines of credit. “Alternative funding” includes 
vendor loans, loans by the LBO sponsor, and off-balance-sheet financing. Probability-values for rejecting the equality among groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test are 
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  % of debt maturing 
within 5 years 
  % Term Loan A / 
Total Debt 
  % Term Loan A / 
Total Bank Debt 
  % Contingent debt exc. 
revolver / Total Debt 
  % Alternative funding 
/ Total Debt 
  Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median 
Whole sample  0.22  0.18    0.26  0.24    0.37  0.36    0.03  0    0.03  0 
Time periods                             
1980-84  0.07  0.05    0.69  0.73    0.93  1.00          0.11  0.08 
1985-89  0.18  0.08    0.42  0.44    0.88  1.00          0.13  0.06 
1990-94  0.28  0.25    0.17  0.21    0.64  0.69    0  0    0.03  0 
1995-99  0.24  0.19    0.27  0.23    0.45  0.44    0.03  0    0.03  0 
2000-04  0.29  0.27    0.31  0.31    0.40  0.46    0.03  0    0.03  0 
2005-08  0.17  0.13    0.16  0.04    0.20  0.12    0.05  0    0.02  0 
KW p-value  0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.00***   
US High-Yield Spread                           
Quartile 1  0.14  0.09    0.13  0    0.18  0    0.05  0    0.01  0 
Quartile 2  0.23  0.18    0.26  0.25    0.39  0.38    0.04  0    0.03  0 
Quartile 3  0.24  0.22    0.29  0.27    0.44  0.46    0.02  0    0.03  0 
Quartile 4  0.31  0.29    0.3  0.3    0.41  0.47    0.03  0    0.04  0 
KW p-value  0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.01***   
S&P E/P minus High-Yield-rate                         
Quartile 1  0.31  0.29    0.34  0.32    0.47  0.49    0.02  0    0.04  0 
Quartile 2  0.23  0.19    0.29  0.27    0.52  0.5    0.03  0    0.05  0 
Quartile 3  0.21  0.19    0.21  0.19    0.27  0.27    0.04  0    0.02  0 
Quartile 4  0.16  0.14    0.15  0.05    0.19  0.12    0.04  0    0.02  0 
KW p-value  0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.01***   
Credit Tightening                         
Quartile 1 (easy)  0.23  0.21    0.22  0.24    0.3  0.33    0.03  0    0.01  0 
Quartile 2  0.23  0.19    0.23  0.22    0.34  0.35    0.03  0    0.03  0 
Quartile 3  0.19  0.13    0.19  0.14    0.27  0.22    0.05  0    0.02  0 
Quartile 4 (tight)  0.29  0.26    0.31  0.29    0.42  0.43    0.03  0    0.04  0 
KW p-value  0.00***      0.00***      0.00***      0.06*      0.01**     52 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for regression variables 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses in Tables 10-14. “Public” 
variables are median values for all public companies in COMPUSTAT and Global COMPUSTAT in the same 
region, Fama-French 49 industry, and month as the corresponding LBO transaction. “Adjuster” variables are median 
values for public companies whose debt to book capital changed by more than 10 percentage points in absolute value 
in the year of the LBO. “Issuer” variables are median values for public companies whose long-term debt increased 
by more than 10 percentage points of this year’s total book assets in the year of the LBO.  Fund characteristics are 
calculated using data from Capital IQ and Preqin.  “EV / fund size” is the enterprise value of the LBO transaction 
divided by the fund size of the acquiring PE fund.  Sponsor rankings are explained in Appendix B.  “Bank affiliated” 
means that the PE sponsor was a subsidiary of a commercial bank, investment bank, or insurance company. Fund 
return data is from Preqin by June 2009.  “Preqin fund benchmark IRR” are average fund returns for funds of the 
same vintage, region, and market segment. 
 
  N  Mean  Min  25th 
%tile 
Median  75th 
%tile 
Max 
LBO characteristics               
LBO D/EV  1002  0.69  0.00  0.61  0.70  0.78  0.99 
LBO log D/EBITDA  1143  1.66  0.18  1.44  1.65  1.86  3.82 
LBO I/EBITDA  873  0.50  0.00  0.32  0.45  0.61  8.06 
LBO log EV/EBITDA  1009  2.04  -0.01  1.81  2.02  2.25  3.63 
Macro variables               
Corp. tax rate in country and year  1153  37.2  10.0  34.5  39.3  39.3  56.8 
US high-yield spread  1118  5.53  2.23  3.46  5.01  6.74  12.31 
Public  …               
  D/EV  1131  0.36  -0.11  0.26  0.35  0.47  0.85 
  log D/EBITDA  1149  1.28  -1.67  1.14  1.34  1.52  3.64 
  I/EBITDA  1149  0.13  -2.65  0.09  0.12  0.16  0.45 
  log EV/EBITDA  1130  2.48  1.65  2.29  2.45  2.62  3.90 
  M/B ratio  1131  1.57  0.62  1.18  1.44  1.74  6.14 
  sales growth  1147  1.33  0.17  0.95  1.08  1.17  95.82 
  ROIC  1149  0.10  -0.25  0.09  0.11  0.12  0.24 
  Volatility in ROIC  1149  0.05  0.00  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.24 
Public adjuster …               
  D/EV  1033  0.35  -0.09  0.23  0.33  0.46  1.09 
  log D/EBITDA  1125  1.40  -0.95  1.17  1.43  1.67  4.71 
  I/EBITDA  1127  0.18  0.00  0.10  0.15  0.22  4.06 
Public debt issuer …               
  D/EV  1041  0.34  -0.09  0.24  0.33  0.44  0.98 
  log D/EBITDA  1130  1.57  -0.04  1.38  1.55  1.74  3.67 
  I/EBITDA  1130  0.15  -2.68  0.10  0.13  0.18  0.56 
Private equity sponsor/fund               
  Sponsor top decile in fundraising  1049  0.32  0  0  0  1  1 
  Sponsor top decile in no. of funds  1157  0.30  0  0  0  1  1 
  Sponsor top 2% in deals last 3 yrs.  1126  0.74  0  0  1  1  1 
  Fund size, 2008 USD millions  1059  3773  17  1092  2395  4861  23047 
  Log Fund size  1059  7.71  2.83  6.99  7.78  8.49  10.05 
  EV / fund size  930  0.72  0.01  0.16  0.28  0.60  32.84 
  Bank affiliated sponsor (dummy)  1157  0.15           
  Fund IRR (%)  610  21.4  -17.1  11.2  19.6  28.9  109.9 
  First-time fund (dummy)  1079  0.09           
  IRR in previous fund (%)  620  22.6  -18.3  11.5  22.1  28.9  109.9 
  Preqin fund benchmark IRR (%)  643  20.0  3.0  10.2  16.5  30.7  38.9   53 
Table 10: LBO vs. Public Company Median Leverage and Debt Market Conditions 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of LBO and matched public company median leverage on the 
U.S. high-yield bond spread over LIBOR (“High-yield spread”) and various other controls. “Public” variables are 
median values for all public companies in COMPUSTAT (or Global COMPUSTAT for non-U.S. deals) in the same 
region, Fama-French 49 industry, and month as the corresponding LBO transaction. “Adjuster” variables are median 
values for public companies whose debt-to-book capital ratio changed by more than 10 percentage points in absolute 
value in the year of the LBO. OLS regression coefficients and t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the LBO 
deal-year level are displayed in the table. Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% 
(***) levels. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES 


















             
High-yield spread  0.017***  0.005  0.003*  0.022***  0.023***  0.010*** 
  11.261  1.667  1.992  9.865  6.549  3.981 
Western Europe  0.035***  0.121***  -0.030***  0.033*  0.007  -0.067*** 
  3.159  4.521  -4.346  1.798  0.177  -5.659 
Rest of World  -0.055*  -0.346**  -0.058***  0.036  -0.784***  -0.095*** 
  -2.009  -2.42  -4.25  0.595  -4.302  -4.965 
             
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Constant  0.187***  1.088***  0.130***  0.203***  1.406***  0.227** 
  4.4  7.776  9.497  3.084  7.485  2.241 
             
Observations  1092  1110  1110  995  1087  1089 
R-squared  0.7  0.759  0.897  0.419  0.458  0.295 
             




















             
Public D/EV  0.040      0.072*     
  1.306      1.971     
Public log D/EBITDA    -0.081***      -0.044   
    -3.077      -1.591   
Public I/EBITDA      0.208      0.302 
      1.233      1.622 
High-yield spread        -0.010***  -0.059***  -0.043*** 
        -3.409  -7.938  -6.209 
             
Constant  0.676***  1.760***  0.478***  0.716***  2.034***  0.698*** 
  72.136  33.019  9.531  55.234  44.037  15.564 
             
Observations  983  1136  871  944  1097  871 
R-squared  0.002  0.010  0.004  0.033  0.161  0.081 
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Table 10: LBO vs. Public Company Median Leverage and Debt Market Conditions 
(continued) 
 




















             
Public D/EV  0.040      0.070*     
  1.251      2.040     
Public log D/EBITDA    -0.048**      -0.022   
    -2.315      -1.283   
Public I/EBITDA      0.121      0.202* 
      1.202      1.824 
High-yield spread        -0.009***  -0.050***  -0.038*** 
        -3.845  -7.705  -5.000 
Private company  -0.038**  0.045  0.031  -0.042**  0.007  -0.000 
  -2.444  1.321  0.986  -2.717  0.217  -0.010 
Privatization/Bankruptcy  -0.178***  -0.308***  0.018  -0.179***  -0.303***  0.008 
  -3.767  -3.326  0.220  -3.807  -4.779  0.112 
Public-to-private  0.037*  0.197***  0.166***  0.012  0.138***  0.119*** 
  1.769  5.416  4.159  0.626  3.680  3.146 
Secondary  -0.022**  0.143***  0.102**  -0.032***  0.081***  0.060 
  -2.741  4.049  2.112  -5.103  3.061  1.287 
Western Europe  -0.009  -0.076**  -0.119***  -0.003  -0.060**  -0.119*** 
  -0.580  -2.501  -3.102  -0.167  -2.160  -3.096 
Rest of World  0.012  -0.074  -0.106**  0.012  -0.100  -0.183*** 
  0.255  -0.543  -2.232  0.258  -0.758  -4.478 
Enterprise value quartile 2  0.023*  0.110***  0.022  0.019*  0.092**  -0.008 
  2.026  2.852  0.453  1.819  2.484  -0.176 
Enterprise value quartile 3  0.041***  0.251***  0.105**  0.039***  0.234***  0.070 
  4.118  9.394  2.131  3.882  10.229  1.442 
Enterprise value quartile 4  0.047***  0.368***  0.131***  0.044***  0.323***  0.084** 
  4.273  8.652  2.929  4.718  11.008  2.150 
Constant  0.649***  1.468***  0.390***  0.697***  1.766***  0.648*** 
  44.446  48.558  6.301  41.787  35.888  8.910 
             
Observations  983  1005  773  944  966  773 
R-squared  0.081  0.223  0.084  0.089  0.319  0.137 
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Table 11: Leverage and company characteristics 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of LBO and matched public company median leverage on the 
U.S. high-yield bond spread over LIBOR (“High-yield spread”) and various other controls. “Public” variables are 
median values for all public companies in COMPUSTAT (or Global COMPUSTAT for non-U.S. deals) in the same 
region, Fama-French 49 industry, and month as the corresponding LBO transaction. OLS regression coefficients and 
T -statistics using standard errors clustered at the LBO deal-year level are displayed in the table. Coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 




















             
High-yield spread  0.012***  -0.006  0.005  -0.009***  -0.049***  -0.038*** 
  5.878  -1.458  1.286  -4.344  -7.274  -4.796 
Public Market / Book  -0.099***  -0.154***  -0.012  -0.021**  0.010  -0.004 
  -5.542  -4.898  -1.163  -2.488  0.493  -0.205 
Public sales growth  -0.001***  0.001  -0.001**  -0.000  0.003***  -0.000 
  -5.319  1.327  -2.476  -0.727  4.540  -0.185 
Public ROIC  -0.290***  -2.676***  0.456  0.151  -0.024  0.002 
  -5.245  -6.661  0.833  1.224  -0.079  0.006 
Public ROIC volatility  -2.931***  -14.155***  0.104  0.092  0.629  -0.043 
  -13.045  -15.566  0.123  0.406  1.415  -0.179 
Corporate tax rate  -0.001  -0.004  -0.000  0.002  -0.006*  -0.005** 
  -0.632  -1.668  -0.854  0.693  -2.060  -2.132 
Western Europe  -0.022  0.013  -0.037***  -0.009  -0.109  -0.306*** 
  -0.806  0.144  -3.403  -0.163  -0.666  -3.453 
Rest of World  0.022  0.068  -0.020  0.013  -0.098***  -0.151*** 
  1.621  1.527  -1.343  0.552  -3.388  -3.886 
Private company        -0.043**  -0.001  -0.004 
        -2.654  -0.024  -0.135 
Privatization/Bankruptcy        -0.177***  -0.323***  0.000 
        -3.718  -5.332  0.002 
Public-to-private        0.015  0.125***  0.122*** 
        0.751  3.389  3.117 
Secondary        -0.032***  0.071**  0.058 
        -5.449  2.788  1.186 
EV quartile 2        0.020*  0.084**  -0.005 
        1.964  2.242  -0.103 
EV quartile 3        0.040***  0.227***  0.074 
        4.237  10.183  1.445 
EV quartile 4        0.045***  0.313***  0.087** 
        4.851  11.107  2.190 
             
Constant  0.650***  2.702***  0.092  0.660***  1.922***  0.867*** 
  8.929  22.156  0.643  6.417  14.788  7.961 
             
Observations  1087  1087  1087  939  948  761 
R-squared  0.584  0.582  0.045  0.099  0.322  0.133 
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Table 12:  Determinants of LBO Pricing 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of LBO and matched public company valuations, as measured by 
the logarithm of Enterprise Value divided by EBITDA (“EV multiple”), on the U.S. high-yield bond spread over 
LIBOR  (“High-yield  spread”)  and  various  other  controls.  “Public”  variables  are  median  values  for  all  public 
companies in COMPUSTAT (or Global COMPUSTAT for non-U.S. deals) in the same region, Fama-French 49 
industry, and month as the corresponding LBO transaction.  Specifications (5) and (6) are 2SLS regressions where 
LBO leverage is instrumented with the U.S. High-yield spread and the fraction of Term Loan A to total debt, 
respectively.  Regression coefficients and t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the LBO deal-year level are 
displayed in the table. Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 






















             
High-yield spread  -0.048***  -0.026***  -0.045***  -0.034***     
  -6.863  -6.070  -6.063  -5.972     
Log LBO D/EBITDA          0.656***  0.808* 
          8.676  1.926 
Public EV multiple      0.106**  0.104**  0.126***  0.130*** 
      2.234  2.468  6.183  3.063 
Western Europe        -0.074***  -0.034  -0.015 
        -2.900  -1.486  -0.341 
Rest of World        -0.097  -0.039  -0.023 
        -0.798  -0.562  -0.291 
Private company        0.075**  0.071**  0.070** 
        2.238  2.656  2.317 
Privatization/Bankruptcy        0.158  0.354***  0.397** 
        1.233  2.854  2.264 
Public-to-private        0.107***  0.025  -0.020 
        3.964  0.971  -0.214 
Secondary        0.116***  0.071***  0.052 
        6.046  6.688  1.067 
EV quartile 2        0.092**  0.022  0.002 
        2.328  1.182  0.036 
EV quartile 3        0.200***  0.041*  0.000 
        7.845  2.057  0.001 
EV quartile 4        0.276***  0.063**  0.012 
        10.412  2.345  0.080 
Constant  2.433***  2.728***  2.028***  1.789***  0.589***  0.363 
  27.587  22.561  19.495  18.092  4.907  0.715 
Industry and country             
fixed effects  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
             
Observations  970  1091  951  951  949  985 
R-squared  0.233  0.612  0.123  0.235  0.631  0.631 
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Table 13: Leverage, pricing and fund characteristics 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of leverage and valuation for a sub-sample of LBO transactions for which we can obtain details about the private 
equity sponsor and the fund used for the transaction. See previous tables of definitions of the leverage, valuation, and debt market variables. The size of the 
transaction relative to the fund is measured by the LBO enterprise value over the fund size. Measures of reputation of the PE sponsor include whether the fund 
sponsor was in the top 10% based on amount of funds raised at the time of the deal (among the sponsors in our sample), whether the fund sponsor was in the top 
10% based on amount of number of funds raised at the time of the deal (among the sponsors in our sample), and whether the fund sponsor was among the 2% most 
active at the time of the deal based on number of transactions undertaken during the previous 3 years (using all PE transactions in Capital IQ). We also control for 
whether the fund is affiliated to a bank. Regression coefficients and T -statistics using standard errors clustered at the LBO deal-year level are displayed in the table. 
Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















                 
High-yield bond spread over LIBOR  -0.010***  -0.050***  -0.040***  -0.033***  -0.010***  -0.050***  -0.040***  -0.033*** 
  -4.224  -6.809  -4.752  -5.001  -4.071  -6.930  -4.766  -4.958 
Industry median net debt / EV  0.060*        0.060*       
  1.829        1.874       
Industry median log net debt / 
EBITDA 
  -0.027        -0.026     
    -1.526        -1.458     
Industry median net interest / 
EBITDA 
    0.167*        0.159*   
      1.864        1.950   
Log industry median EV/EBITDA        0.098**        0.094** 
        2.378        2.298 
EV / Fund Size          0.010***  0.008  0.010*  -0.007 
          2.871  1.416  1.913  -1.659 
Sponsor in top decile in fundraising  -0.008  -0.008  0.028  -0.003  -0.005  -0.011  0.026  -0.010 
  -0.798  -0.173  0.868  -0.067  -0.561  -0.235  0.815  -0.259 
Sponsor in top decile in number of 
funds raised 
0.009  0.062***  0.013  0.054**  0.010  0.066***  0.015  0.059** 
  0.849  2.897  0.508  2.214  0.915  3.168  0.596  2.427 
Sponsor 3 year-deal activity in top 2%  -0.021  0.005  -0.055  0.035*  -0.015  0.016  -0.041  0.034 
  -1.601  0.164  -1.133  1.857  -1.140  0.468  -0.815  1.645 
Bank affiliated  0.012  0.048  0.007  -0.002  0.004  0.031  -0.021  -0.005 
  0.786  0.876  0.172  -0.043  0.223  0.578  -0.518  -0.139 
                 
LBO type and region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
EV quartile dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  857  879  706  864  846  866  696  851 
R-squared  0.093  0.327  0.127  0.251  0.102  0.325  0.125  0.244 
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Table 14: Leverage and fund returns 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of the acquiring private equity fund’s IRR (according to Preqin) on LBO deal leverage and various deal and fund 
characteristics.  Regression coefficients and T -statistics displayed in the table. Vintage year refers to the year when the acquiring private equity fund was raised. T-
statistics are clustered both at the vintage year as well as fund level using the method of Thompson (2006) and Petersen (2009) (using Mitchell Petersen’s 
“cluster2”-command in STATA). Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Dependent variable: fund level IRR 
Deal Log D / EBITDA    -6.596**          -6.213** 
    -2.042          -2.360 
Deal D / EV      -2.232         
      -0.472         
Deal Interest / EBITDA        -4.116**       
        -2.285       
Deal Log D/EBITDA, predicted          -9.656**     
          -2.029     
Deal Log D/EBITDA, residual          -6.279*     
          -1.946     
Dummy for D/EBITDA below sample median            -7.174   
            -0.999   
Log D / EBITDA * (D/EBITDA below median)            -3.088   
            -1.237   
Log D / EBITDA * (D/EBITDA above median)            -8.013***   
            -2.751   
Deal EV / Fund Size              -3.148** 
              -2.036 
Log Fund Size, 2008 USD  2.219  2.635*  2.328  2.157  2.649*  2.734*  1.690* 
  1.401  1.713  1.527  1.299  1.922  1.852  1.695 
Log fund sequence number  -0.273  0.261  -0.737  2.002       
  -0.130  0.123  -0.347  0.657       
First-time fund  5.234  5.661  2.771  6.570  5.312  5.524  1.352 
  0.986  1.026  0.517  0.836  1.180  1.210  0.345 
IRR in previous fund  0.363**  0.366**  0.347**  0.367*  0.359**  0.364**  0.259* 
  2.099  2.149  2.136  1.937  2.133  2.232  1.781 
Fund benchmark IRR              0.139 
              1.464 
Vintage year fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry, region, LBO type and year fixed effects   No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Number of LBO deals  515  513  458  407  505  513  450 
Number of funds  154  154  142  144  152  154  139 
Number of vintage years  19  19  19  19  19  19  16 
R-squared  0.390  0.408  0.428  0.380  0.397  0.409  0.600 
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
 
 
Table A1: Additional Sample Characteristics 
 
Panel A: LBO Targets by Country and Primary Fama-French Industry 




  Industry  Number of 
transactions 
  Industry  Number of 
transactions 
USA   683  59.0%    Rtail   102    Insur   16 
UK   138  11.9%    BusSv   91    Txtls   16 
France   101  8.7%    Whlsl   72    ElcEq   14 
Germany   69  6.0%    Telcm   60    LabEq   14 
Netherlands   39  3.4%    Hlth   48    Util   14 
Italy   22  1.9%    BldMt   46    Oil   13 
Sweden   19  1.6%    Mach   46    Boxes   12 
Spain   14  1.2%    Fun   42    Clths   11 
Canada   11  1.0%    Books   40    Steel   11 
Belgium   8  0.7%    Hshld   39    Toys   10 
Denmark   8  0.7%    Chems   37    Agric   9 
Switzerland   8  0.7%    Food   36    Soda   8 
Finland   6  0.5%    Autos   34    Fin   7 
Ireland   6  0.5%    Trans   32    Other   7 
Norway   5  0.4%    Cnstr   31    Banks   4 
Australia   4  0.3%    PerSv   31    Beer   4 
Luxembourg   4  0.3%    Meals   30    Guns   3 
Austria   2  0.2%    Chips   27    Hardw   3 
Bermuda   2  0.2%    MedEq   23    Mines   3 
Czech   2  0.2%    Paper   19    RlEst   3 
Greece   2  0.2%    Rubbr   19    Ships   3 
Hungary   1  0.1%    Softw   18    Coal  0 
Philippines   1  0.1%    Drugs   17    Gold  0 
Poland   1  0.1%    Aero   16    Smoke  0 
Turkey   1  0.1%    FabPr   16       
Total   1157  100.0%             
 
 
   60 
 
Panel B: Transactions by Main LBO Sponsor 
 
Private Equity firm   Deals    Private Equity Firm  Deals    Private Equity Firm  Deals 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co   61    Odyssey Investment Partners LLC   7    Heartland Industrial Partners   2 
Bain Capital   43    PPM Capital Ltd   7    KRG Capital Partners LLC   2 
Carlyle Group   40    Behrman Capital   6    LGV Capital Limited   2 
Blackstone Group   38    DB Capital Partners   6    Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking  2 
Apax Partners   35    HgCapital   6    Littlejohn   2 
CVC Capital Partners   26    Metalmark Capital LLC   6    Monitor Clipper Partners   2 
Candover Partners Ltd   21    MidOcean Partners LLP   6    Nautic Partners   2 
Cinven   20    Sterling Group   6    Parthenon Capital Inc   2 
Permira Advisers Ltd   20    Willis Stein & Partners   6    Quad C   2 
BC Partners Inc   19    AXA Private Equity SA   5    Questor Partners Fund LP   2 
3i Group Plc   18    Bear Stearns Merchant Banking Partners   5    Saratoga Partners   2 
Bridgepoint Capital Ltd   18    Bruckmann Rosser & Sherrell   5    Silver Lake Partners LP   2 
Madison Dearborn Partners   18    Calera Capital   5    Stonington Partners   2 
GTCR Golder Rauner LLC   17    Cerberus Partners   5    Summit Partners LP   2 
INVESTCORP   17    Fenway Partners   5    Thoma Cressey Equity Partners   2 
Kelso & Co   17    Oaktree Capital Management   5    Weiss Peck & Greer Investments   2 
Texas Pacific Group Inc   16    Providence Equity Partners   5    Yucaipa Cos   2 
Warburg Pincus & Co   16    Royal Bank Private Equity   5    Lazard Asset Management LLC   2 
Court Square Capital Partners   15    Wellspring Capital Management   5    Allied Capital Corp   1 
DLJ Merchant Banking   15    Wind Point Partners   5    Audax Group LP   1 
EQT Scandinavia BV   15    ABRY Capital Partners   4    Bessemer Capital Partners   1 
Goldman Sachs Capital Partners   15    Allianz Capital Partners   4    Brockway Moran & Partners Inc   1 
Thomas H Lee Partners   15    Francisco Partners   4    CDC Entreprises   1 
Vestar Capital Partners   15    Harvest Partners   4    Close Brothers Private Equity   1 
ABN AMRO   14    Kohlberg & Co   4    Colony Capital LLC   1 
PAI [Paribas Affaires Industrielles]   14    Onex Corp   4    Cornerstone Equity Investors   1 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice Inc   13    Ripplewood Holdings LLC   4    Deutsche Beteiligungs AG   1 
HM Capital Partners LLC   13    Trivest Partners   4    Drexel Burnham Lambert   1 
JW Childs Associates   13    21 Centrale Partners   3    E.F. Hutton LBO Inc.   1 
Advent International Corp   12    Alpinvest Partners   3    Equita Management GmbH   1 
Leonard Green & Partners   12    American Capital Strategies Ltd   3    First Atlantic Capital Corp   1 
Welsh Carson Anderson & Stowe   12    Arcapita Inc   3    General Atlantic LLC   1 
Doughty Hanson & Co   11    Astorg Partners   3    Great Hill Partners   1 
IK Investment Partners   11    Brentwood Associates   3    Gresham Partners   1 
AEA Investors Inc   10    Butler Capital   3    Gresham Private Equity   1 
Berkshire Partners   10    Centre Partners   3    Henderson Private Equity   1 
Boston Ventures Management   10    Genstar Capital Corp   3    Kirtland Capital Partners II LP   1 
Castle Harlan   10    Golden Gate Capital Inc   3    Liberty Partners   1 
Cypress Group LLC   10    JLL Partners   3    Morgan Lewis Githens & Ahn   1 
Hellman & Friedman LLC   10    Lindsay Goldberg & Bessemer   3    Nordic Capital   1 
Merrill Lynch Capital Partners   10    McCown De Leeuw & Co   3    North Castle Partners   1 
Cognetas/Electra Partners Europe   9    Oak Hill Capital Partners   3    Olympus Partners   1 
First Reserve Corp   9    TA Associates Inc   3    Palamon Capital Partners   1 
Gilde Investments   9    Terra Firma Capital Partners Ltd   3    Phildrew Ventures   1 
LBO France   9    UBS Capital   3    Phoenix Equity Partners   1 
Montagu / HSBC Private Equity   9    Veritas Capital   3    Platinum Equity LLC   1 
Charterhouse Development Capital   8    Veronis Suhler Stevenson   3    Saunders Karp & Megrue   1 
Forstmann Little & Co   8    Gibbons Goodwin & Van Amerongen  3    Sentinel Capital Partners   1 
Freeman Spogli   8    American Securities Capital Partners   2    Stonebridge Partners   1 
One Equity Partners LLC   8    AtriA Capital Partenaires   2    Sun Capital Partners Inc   1 
Alchemy Partners   7    Bridgepoint Capital Ltd [ex-Natwest]   2    TDR Capital LLP   1 
Barclays Private Equity   7    Chequers Capital   2    Thayer Capital Partners   1 
Code Hennessy & Simmons   7    Cravey Green & Wahlen   2    Waterland Private Equity  1 
Duke Street Capital   7    Eurazeo SA   2    Watermill Ventures Ltd   1 
JP Morgan Partners   7    Fox Paine Capital LLC   2    Weston Presidio Capital   1 
Jordan Co   7    HIG Capital   2    Windward Capital   1 
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Table A2: Leverage and pricing determinants in the public-to-private subsample 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of LBO and pre-LBO leverage and valuations on the U.S. high-
yield bond spread over LIBOR (“High-yield spread”), pre-LBO characteristics, and other controls for the subsample 
where pre-LBO financial information was available. “Public” variables are median values for all publicly traded 
firms in COMPUSTAT (or Global COMPUSTAT for non-U.S. deals) in the same region, Fama-French 49 industry, 
and month as the corresponding LBO. Pre-LBO characteristics are taken from the closest financial statement before 
the LBO closing date. Pre-LBO market values are calculated using stock prices 12 months before the LBO closing 
date. In the regressions where pre-LBO leverage is the dependent variable, all independent pre-LBO characteristics 
are lagged one year. t-statistics use standard errors clustered at the LBO deal-year level. Coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 


















             
Pre-LBO log D/EBITDA  0.015  0.024         
  0.324  0.745         
Pre-LBO Net debt / EV      0.081  0.089*     
      1.583  1.886     
Pre-LBO I/EBITDA          0.136  0.166 
          0.936  1.568 
High-yield spread    -0.086***    -0.007    -0.047*** 
    -5.608    -1.025    -8.001 
             
Observations  142  134  97  91  99  99 
R-squared  0.002  0.267  0.027  0.028  0.011  0.297 
             
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 


















             
Pre-LBO M/B  0.167  0.088**  -0.139***  -0.002  0.015  0.038 
  0.867  2.396  -5.512  -0.151  0.734  1.217 
Pre-LBO sales growth  0.387  -0.101  0.027  -0.218*  0.026  0.099 
  0.903  -0.535  0.449  -1.986  0.292  1.058 
Pre-LBO ROIC  -4.124**  -0.974*  -0.038  -0.012  -0.758*  -0.070 
  -2.447  -2.102  -0.099  -0.066  -1.994  -0.463 
Public ROIC volatility  -7.447**  1.366*  -2.290***  -0.680  -0.678*  -0.342 
  -2.928  1.760  -3.516  -1.567  -1.831  -0.569 
Pre-LBO ln(sales)  0.102*  0.033  0.010  0.006  -0.009  -0.007 
  2.118  1.616  0.940  0.773  -1.084  -0.609 
High-yield spread  0.040  -0.066***  0.043***  -0.001  0.014**  -0.039*** 
  0.765  -4.542  3.292  -0.154  2.276  -5.079 
North America  0.043  0.191  -0.051  0.005  0.053  0.089** 
  0.159  1.733  -0.815  0.159  1.667  2.270 
Constant  0.773  1.643***  0.529**  0.741***  0.218*  0.675*** 
  1.138  5.751  2.760  8.348  2.051  4.344 
             
Observations  89  100  86  99  96  75 
R-squared  0.135  0.305  0.476  0.156  0.215  0.310 





























             
Public net debt/EV  0.552**           
  2.43           
Public D/EBITDA    0.323*         
    1.87         
Public I/EBITDA      0.333**       
      2.15       
Pre-LBO log EV/EBITDA            0.114*** 
            3.716 
High-yield spread        -0.071***  -0.063  -0.070*** 
        -3.924  -0.854  -4.434 
Public log EV/EBITDA        0.199  0.388  0.170 
        1.473  1.417  1.403 
North America        0.063  0.292  0.155 
        1.276  1.038  1.718 
             
Constant  0.213***  0.550***  0.116***  1.938***  1.144  1.670*** 
  3.23  4.54  3.96  5.729  1.166  4.948 
             
Observations  98  144  153  148  97  99 
R-squared  0.106  0.017  0.019  0.264  0.049  0.331 
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Appendix B: Definition of Fund Ranking Variables 
 
“Fund Raising” and “Number of Funds Raised” Ranks: For the deals in our data set, we 
managed to identify 188 sponsors for which we had information about fund structure and fund 
raising from CIQ and Preqin.  For each of these sponsors, we constructed a yearly observation of 
how  many  funds  and  how  much  total  money  (in  2008  USD)  the  sponsor  had  raised  since 
inception.  For each year, we then ranked these 188 sponsors relative to each other according to 
number of funds raised and dollars raised.  If in a given year, a sponsor had not yet raised any 
fund, that sponsor was excluded from the ranking in that year.  From the ranking we calculated a 
percentile for each year and sponsor from 0 to 1.  For example, Hellman & Friedman had a 
fundraising rank of 0.13 in 2005, meaning that up to and including 2005, they had raised more 
money than 87% of the 188 sponsors. In the regressions, we use dummy variables for whether a 
deal was done by a sponsor in the top decile according to these measures. 
 
“Number of Deals in Last Three Years” Rank:  For this variable, we started with the universe 
of all buyout deals in CIQ (around 19800 deals from 1969 to 2008), and matched them to buying 
sponsors  uniquely  identified  in  CIQ.    Each  deal  is  matched  to  between  1  and  12  sponsors, 
depending on how many sponsors participated in the deal.  There is a total of around 6300 unique 
sponsors that have participated as buyers in at least one LBO deal in CIQ.  For each month, we 
calculated how many CIQ deals they had participated in for the last three years.  For each month, 
we then ranked the total universe of sponsors relative to each other according to number of deals 
done in the last three years.  If in a given month, a sponsor had not yet participated in any deal, 
that sponsor was excluded from the ranking in that month.  From the ranking we calculated a 
percentile for each month and sponsor from 0 to 1.  For example, Hellman & Friedman had a deal 
rank  of  0.043  in  January  of  2005,  meaning  that  from  February  2002  to  January  2005,  they 
participated  in  more  deals  than  95.7%  of  all  sponsors  active  in  CIQ  up  to  that  date.  In  the 
regressions, we use a dummy variable for whether the sponsor was in the top two percentiles 
according to this measure. 
 